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This research examines associations between perfectionism and acceptance for the self 
and towards others, alongside their link with psychological health. Reported beliefs are 
compared with underlying implicit beliefs, as measured by response latencies on the 
Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006). Ninety-
nine native English-language speaking university students completed measures of self-
oriented and other-oriented perfectionism, unconditional self-acceptance, acceptance of 
others and general health; together with the IRAP computer task. Self-perfectionism 
scores were observed to be significantly higher than other-perfectionism scores on both 
explicit and implicit measures. Acceptance of others was significantly higher than self-
acceptance on explicit measures; however the two were non-significantly different as 
recorded by the IRAP. This suggests that participants may have under-reported self-
acceptance levels or over-reported their acceptance of others. Possible reasons for this 
are explored. In addition, all explicit measures demonstrated no significant associations 
with implicit findings; meaning that participants‟ responses to the assessment tasks 
appeared to be driven by different processes. Low levels of explicit self-acceptance were 
the biggest predictor of psychological distress. As such, this research provides further 













„Have no fear of perfection:  
you‟ll never reach it‟ 
 
(Salvador Dali)  
 
 
1.1. General Introduction 
Psychological research continues to highlight the role of personality factors in the field 
of mental health and psychopathology. Perfectionism is one factor that is frequently 
associated with a range of difficulties including depression (Hewitt & Flett, 1991a), 
anxiety (Antony et al., 1998), suicidal ideation (Dean et al., 1996), eating disorder 
(Fairburn, 1997), personality disorder (Hewitt & Flett, 1991) and social phobia 
(Heimberg et al., 1995). Although Hamacheck (1978) proposed that some aspects of 
perfectionism might be adaptive – promoting excellence and motivating an individual to 
achieve personal goals; the majority of existing research presents perfectionism as a 
complex but negative attribute (Blatt, 1995; Frost et al., 1990). 
 
Frost and colleagues (1990) define perfectionism as a demand for the highest standard of 
excellence, combined with overly critical evaluations of performance. Its adverse effects 
have been emphasised both in terms of immediate negative outcome (feelings of failure, 
guilt, shame, low self-esteem) and with respect to chronic unhappiness and future 




difficult to treat, but it has also been proven to impede the effectiveness of treatment 
interventions for other psychological disorders (Blatt et al., 1998). The role of 
perfectionism is therefore a key issue in the field of mental health. 
 
Several definitions of perfectionism have been generated over the years and it is now 
understood as a multidimensional construct (Frost et al., 1990; Hewitt & Flett, 1991). 
Hewitt and Flett (1991) proposed three specific dimensions of perfectionism; self-
oriented (perfectionistic demands towards the self), other-oriented (perfectionistic 
demands towards others) and socially-prescribed (perceived perfectionistic demands 
from others towards the self) components, each of which they believed contribute 
towards general perfectionist behaviour. This is thought to involve the setting of 
excessively high goals for achievement in various areas of life, relating not only to 
actions but also to individual thoughts and feelings (Flett & Hewitt, 2002). 
 
During the last decade, a small number of studies have examined the associations 
between perfectionism and the concept of acceptance (e.g. Flett et al., 2003; Scott, 
2007). Acceptance is also proposed to consist of several dimensions, of which self-
acceptance refers to an individual's satisfaction or happiness with himself (Shepard, 
1979). Results suggest that dimensions of perfectionism are associated with lower levels 
of self-acceptance (Ellis, 2002; Flett et al., 2002); and the latter has been named as a 
„buffer‟ between perfectionism and depression (Scott, 2007). Thus, high levels of self-
acceptance are thought to protect an individual from the often counterproductive and 




of perfectionism (Hamacheck, 1978). Self-acceptance involves self-understanding, a 
realistic awareness of both positive and negative attributes and an individual feeling they 
are of ‘unique worth’ (English & English, 1958). It is thought to be necessary for good 
mental health and in the clinical setting self-acceptance is often considered essential for 
‘change’ to occur (Ellis, 1962). This can be achieved by encouraging an individual to 
stop criticising themselves and trying to solve perceived ‘defects’ by beginning to 
tolerate and accept the self as imperfect in some parts. As such, perfectionism and self-
acceptance may be important components in understanding and overcoming mental 
health difficulties. 
 
A further dimension of acceptance has been identified as acceptance of others. This is 
thought to reflect an individuals‟ love, approval and respect for others whether or not 
their behaviour, thoughts and feelings are appropriate, intelligent or „correct‟ (Ellis, 
1977). Currently, no existing literature has examined the links between acceptance of 
others and dimensions of perfectionism; however self-acceptance and acceptance of 
others have been explored as related factors themselves. Kelly (1955) states it is 
impossible to have a construct to evaluate others without using the same construct to 
evaluate the self, and a considerable amount of research supports a positive relation 
between favourableness of self-evaluation and evaluation of others (e.g. Fey, 1957; 
Sheerer, 1949; Phillips, 1951). However, in a study using an implicit measure of self-
esteem, Karpinski (2004) reports that in general the ‘self’ was contrasted with the 
‘other’; so that when the other was ‘positive’, fewer positive self-associations were 




made. As such, the associations between self and other are somewhat unclear when 
implicit and explicit findings are compared. 
 
The majority of existing perfectionism research uses explicit self-report questionnaires 
to gather data and as such, findings may be susceptible to bias. Observer ratings have 
been used to examine the validity of these existing self-report measures (e.g. Hewitt & 
Flett, 1991a); however the implicit measurement of perfectionism has never been 
attempted. Such implicit examination would seem particularly relevant in the domain of 
perfectionism, as the social impact of revealing perfectionistic tendencies could be 
somewhat detrimental. Indeed, other-oriented perfectionism is alleged to be an important 
aspect in maladjustment and has frequently been associated with other-directed blame, 
lack of trust, social hostility and punitive tendencies towards others (Hunter & 
O’Connor, 2003). Therefore, as social beings who seek to form close relationships with 
others, it may be that the full extent of an individuals’ other-oriented perfectionism and 
lack of acceptance of others can not be entirely acknowledged consciously.  
 
In addition, it could be speculated that the impossibility of achieving ‘perfection’ and the 
potential detrimental impact of being overly self-perfectionistic, are increasingly 
becoming common knowledge. Thus, a highly perfectionistic individual may be unable 
to explicitly present themselves as such, because doing so could be seen as 
acknowledging an imperfection; as they possess a quality that frequently proves itself to 
be a hindrance. Given this speculation, the comparison between implicit and explicit 




have a large impact on current understanding of these constructs, which will now be 
explored in further detail. 
 
1.2. Perfectionism: Definition and Clinical Aspects 
The body of evidence regarding perfectionism has grown extensively over recent 
decades (Flett & Hewitt, 2002; Lundh et al., 2008; Stoeber et al., 2008). However, this 
has generated several conceptualisations of the personality construct and to date, 
researchers have been unable to agree on a single comprehensive definition.  
 
Early investigators such as Adler (1956) and Horney (1950) conceptualised 
perfectionism as a specific „neurotic‟ reaction to underlying feelings of inferiority and 
insecurity; and Pacht (1984) defined it as „the belief that a perfect state exists that one 
should always try to attain‟ (p.386). The common element between these early 
approaches appeared to be the setting of excessively high standards for personal 
performance; with a dysfunctional attitude and irrational beliefs as the key factors 
driving perfectionistic behaviour (Burns, 1980). This cognitive approach underlies the 
majority of one-dimensional theories regarding perfectionism, although all differ slightly 
in their wording. 
 
Following on from these initial investigations, Hamachek (1978) was the first to suggest 
that some aspects of perfectionism might in fact be adaptive. He proposed that 
perfectionism be conceptualised in terms of „normal‟ and „neurotic‟ aspects; overcoming 




„normal‟ perfectionism involved striving for reasonable and realistic standards, which 
resulted in an increased sense of personal satisfaction and self-esteem. On the other hand 
„neurotic‟ perfectionism was defined as the striving for excessively high standards, 
which he believed was generated by a fear of failure and the desire to avoid letting 
others down. Whilst these distinctions can be queried with regards to whether 
Hamachek‟s definition of „normal‟ perfectionism simply describes conscientiousness; 
his conceptualisation prompted other researchers to begin investigating what it is that 
makes perfectionism functional for some individuals and dysfunctional for others.  
 
Slade and Owens (1998) subsequently defined perfectionism in terms of „positive‟ and 
„negative‟ components and suggested distinguishing between the two in terms of 
reinforcement. They described „positive‟ perfectionism as perfectionistic behaviour that 
is positively reinforced (e.g. by achievement, or feedback from others) and involves 
being actively engaged in striving to achieve. „Negative‟ perfectionism on the other hand 
was conceptualised as behaviour that is negatively reinforced, meaning it is driven by an 
individual wishing to avoid an unpleasant or punishing outcome. On reflection, the 
distinction between these two forms of perfectionism may not be as clear as the authors 
suggest, as it seems possible for an individual to be both actively engaged in the desire 
to achieve, alongside simultaneously motivated by the wish to avoid a negative outcome. 
For example, an individual who stays late at work may be motivated by the goal of 
completing a task perfectly; and at the same time, wish to avoid feelings of anxiety or 
inadequacy if the task is left incomplete. As such, it may be difficult to assess whether 




could be said to miss the more intricate details of the perfectionism construct, 
particularly those involving an interpersonal perspective. 
 
As such, the conceptualisation of perfectionism has evolved from that of an exclusively 
cognitive orientation into one incorporating behavioural, motivational and interpersonal 
elements. Two independent teams of researchers simultaneously proposed a multi-
dimensional approach to perfectionism, reflecting both personal and interpersonal 
aspects of the construct (Frost et al., 1990; Hewitt & Flett, 1991). The first of these was 
Frost and his colleagues (1990) who hypothesised that perfectionism was composed of 
six distinct dimensions. They suggested four of these dimensions were directed towards 
the self (concern over mistakes, doubts about actions, high personal standards and 
organisation) and two reflected perceived interpersonal demands (high parental 
expectations and parental criticism). They associated such high standards with a fear of 
failure, which they believed motivated many of the components.  
 
Hewitt and Flett (1991) were the second team to propose that although perfectionism for 
the self is an essential element in the construct, interpersonal perfectionism components 
also exist that impact significantly on an individual‟s psychological health. They 
hypothesised that perfectionism comprises three specific dimensions; self-oriented, 
other-oriented and socially prescribed components, each of which they believed to be a 
vital factor in general perfectionist behaviour (Hewitt & Flett, 1991). There is a large 




and Flett‟s model generates „self‟ and „other‟ perfectionism scores it was used in the 
present research. This model will now be outlined in further detail. 
 
1.2.1.  Self-Oriented Perfectionism 
Hewitt and Flett (1991) propose that self-oriented perfectionism manifests itself in 
several ways, all of which involve irrational beliefs equating perfection for the self with 
self-worth. Individuals often set unrealistic personal standards („ideal self‟) and 
constantly strive to attain these levels of perfection. They also engage in all-or-nothing 
thinking, whereby if total success is not achieved, the outcome is seen as a complete 
failure. As targets are often so far out of an individual‟s reach, they are rarely met and 
selective attention to the void between „ideal self‟ and „actual self‟ heightens failure 
experiences; as do overly severe self-evaluations and self-criticism. On the rare occasion 
a self-oriented perfectionist does achieve a goal, it is often accompanied by a lack of 
satisfaction as the individual was „expecting‟ such a result (Hamachek, 1978). Despite 
constant failure experiences, individuals continue to set exacting standards and as such, 
self-oriented perfectionism is often associated with low self-regard and feelings of 
worthlessness, which may lead to depression and psychological distress (Higgins et al., 
1986; Hewitt & Dyck, 1986). 
 
Links have been made between self-oriented perfectionism and conscientiousness (Hill 
et al., 1997). However, Flett and Hewitt (2002) suggest that self-oriented perfectionism 
is a more extreme form of conscientiousness that goes well beyond the realm covered by 




1.2.2. Other-Oriented Perfectionism 
The second proposed perfectionism dimension involves interpersonal standards of 
perfection, focusing on an individual‟s beliefs and expectations about the capabilities of 
others (Hewitt & Flett, 1991). The other-oriented perfectionists‟ behaviour is essentially 
the same as self-oriented perfectionism; however perfectionistic behaviour is directed 
outward. Thus, other-oriented perfectionists set unrealistic standards for significant 
others, critically evaluate their performance and place major importance on their being 
perfect. Although this dimension is an important aspect of maladjustment, often leading 
to other-directed blame, lack of trust and social hostility; research demonstrates it is 
rarely associated with depression, which may be attributable to a decrease in focus on 
the self (Hollender, 1965; Hunter & O‟Connor, 2003). 
 
1.2.3. Socially-Prescribed Perfectionism 
The final dimension defined by Hewitt and Flett (1991) involves the perception that 
others expect perfection from oneself. This socially-prescribed perfectionism again 
involves the same behaviours as self-oriented perfectionism; however the standards of 
perfection are attributed to others. In this case, an individual believes (correctly or 
otherwise) that significant others impose excessive and uncontrollable standards upon 
them, evaluate them critically and place pressure on them to be perfect (Hewitt & Flett, 
1991). Due to the perceived inability to please others and the uncontrollable nature of 
perfectionist standards, negative emotions such as anxiety, depression and hopelessness 
are common among socially prescribed perfectionists (Chang & Rand, 2000; Hewitt et 




the most consistent predictor of many forms of psychological distress and has also been 
linked to relapse after treatment (Hooley & Teasdale, 1989). 
 
Socially-prescribed perfectionism has additionally shown significant positive 
correlations with neuroticism; defined as a tense, emotionally labile and insecure 
personality (Costa et al., 1992). However, research demonstrates that neuroticism does 
not predict longitudinal increases in this perfectionism dimension (Stoeber et al., 2009). 
As such, trait neuroticism is thought to play little (if any) role in the development of 
socially-prescribed perfectionism. 
 
Hewitt and Flett (1991) and Frost and his colleagues (1990) both developed scales to 
measure their proposed dimensions of perfectionism and a number of studies have used 
both of these measures concurrently in order to gain a better understanding of the 
overlap between the two approaches. This research has led to some interesting findings, 
suggesting the presence of several unique factors in each questionnaire, alongside a large 
degree of overlap between the two scales. It is this overlap that further prompted 
authors‟ attempts to define the „core‟ factors that together make up the concept of 
perfectionism.   
 
Frost and colleagues (1993) suggested the two critical factors were „positive strivings‟ 
(generated from self-oriented, other-oriented, high personal standards and organisation 
dimensions) and „maladaptive evaluation concerns‟ (generated from socially-prescribed, 




actions dimensions). Similarly, Dunkley and colleagues (2000) proposed that „personal 
standards perfectionism‟ (self-oriented and high personal standards dimensions) and 
„evaluative concerns perfectionism‟ (socially-prescribed, concern over mistakes and 
doubts about actions dimensions) were the two vital factors. Finally, in 2007 Scott 
proposed these different factors all broadly summarised the perfectionistic striving to 
attain high standards and an evaluation of the outcome of that effort. 
 
Despite the lack of consensus regarding the „core‟ components, an implicit assumption 
made by authors in the field appears to be that perfectionism tends to be more „extreme‟ 
and causes difficulty when it involves standards an individual sets for a wide range of 
life domains (e.g. workplace achievements, appearance and interpersonal relationships). 
Flett and Hewitt (2002) point out that perhaps the defining feature in relation to adaptive 
versus maladaptive perfectionism may well involve this „limited‟ versus „global‟ factor; 
however this assumption has not yet been investigated empirically. Mitchelson and 
Burns (1998) have compared the differences between reported perfectionism in the home 
and the work setting, although not in an accumulative manner. They discovered that 
levels of perfectionism, as recorded by an adapted version of Hewitt and Flett‟s 
Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (MPS), were significantly higher in a work setting 
than at home. Perhaps this involves the social nature of the work environment where 
individuals often work as part of a team, are managed or supervised by others and their 
performance is evaluated regularly. Thus, there is a greater benchmark for measuring 
performance and perhaps a greater perceived negative consequence of failure than in the 




Whilst the lack of consensus regarding the „core‟ factors of perfectionism may indeed 
result from an absence of research investigating the limited versus global elements of 
perfectionism; it may also be attributable to the numerous ways in which perfectionism 
is thought to develop, which will now be discussed further. 
 
1.3. Developmental Origins of Perfectionism  
Despite the increasing number of studies examining perfectionism and seeking to define 
it as a personality construct; only a small number have focused on the particular origins 
of perfectionism for individuals (e.g. Andersson & Perris, 2000; Flynn et al., 2001; 
Slaney & Ashby, 1996). As such, there are several theoretical accounts regarding its 
origin which are yet to be backed up by empirical evidence. These involve both 
individual personality factors, alongside a number of environmental and interpersonal 
factors. Given the range of potential factors involved in the development of 
perfectionism, it is likely that for different individuals different factors will apply. This 
could explain the variety that can be observed in the literature conceptualising 
perfectionism, as the interaction between factors places the perfectionism emphasis in a 
slightly different place each time. These factors will now be explored in turn. 
 
1.3.1. Environmental Influences 
Several theories suggest the family environment and an individual‟s childhood 
developmental experiences have a large role to play in the development of 
perfectionistic tendencies (Blatt, 1995; Hamachek, 1978; Sorotzkin, 1998). In particular 




co-occur with absent, inconsistent or conditional parental approval. Barrow and Moore 
(1983) suggest this may lead to perfectionist attitudes, behaviours and thinking in the 
child; such that they attempt to elicit parental approval by being „perfect‟ and 
simultaneously internalise the high standards and expectations set by the parental figure, 
for their own behaviour. One population frequently engaging in this pattern of parenting 
is depressed mothers, who often have high standards and expectations of their child‟s 
behaviour and low levels of reward, warmth and acceptance (Cole & Rehm, 1986).  
 
This theory stems from Rogers‟ (1951) work on „conditions of worth‟ and can lead to a 
child developing chronic feelings of helplessness and hopelessness, if they are 
consistently unable to meet the high expectations set by their parents. This conditional 
sense of self-worth can leave individuals feeling distressed and helpless when receiving 
negative feedback from others (Flett & Hewitt, 2002). Hollender (1965) suggested 
perfectionistic tendencies thus arise as a way of „covering up‟ perceived flaws and 
inadequacies; meaning individuals frequently feel unable or reluctant to give up 
perfectionism, as it is the only means by which they feel acceptable (Frost et al., 1995).  
 
Conversely, a neglected child may experience an absence of their parental figures setting 
any expectations or standards for their behaviour and Hamachek (1978) suggests this 
can be just as problematic. In these circumstances, children can develop their own 
guidelines and high standards for their behaviour, to cope with the experience of 




between neglect and perfectionism has not been empirically investigated and therefore 
requires further clarification. 
 
A further environmental factor influencing the development of perfectionism involves 
social learning theory. Bandura (1986) demonstrated that in-line with idealisation of 
their parental figures, children frequently imitate the standards they observe their parents 
following. This can involve both self-oriented and other-oriented standards of 
perfection. For example, if a mother only gives herself positive reinforcement when she 
meets a particularly high standard, her child is likely to imitate this pattern of reward and 
will not feel satisfied if achieving anything less than the high standard (Bandura & 
Kupers, 1964). Conversely, the children of parents with relatively lower standards who 
congratulate themselves for meeting these lower level achievements, are also likely to 
imitate their parents and present with reduced perfectionistic tendencies. Furthermore, 
the children of parents with high other-evaluative tendencies are more likely to mimic 
this behaviour, receive reinforcement for it from their parents and thus become highly 
evaluative and perfectionistic towards others themselves. 
 
The social learning theory regarding perfectionism has been inadvertently tested by 
researchers examining both parent and child levels of perfectionism (Chang, 2000; Vieth 
& Trull, 1999). Frost, Lahart and Rosenblate (1991) demonstrated a significant 
association between mother and daughter levels of perfectionism; however a lack of 
association was observed between fathers and daughters. This fits with 




expression of an emotional tie with another person (Freud, 1921). This typically 
involves little girls identifying with their mothers and little boys identifying with their 
fathers and incorporating this „model‟ into their own internal world. Thus „modelling‟ 
and imitation which is reinforced, appear to offer a reasonable explanation for the 
developmental origins of perfectionism. 
 
Flett and Hewitt (2002) additionally outline the „social reaction model‟ and „anxious 
rearing model‟ as two further potential environmental influences on perfectionism 
development. The social reaction model involves extreme levels of environmental 
hostility and proposes that children who are exposed to abusive and chaotic early 
environments involving „physical [and/or sexual] abuse, psychological maltreatment 
including love withdrawal and exposure to shame; or a chaotic family environment‟ 
(p.93) frequently respond by adopting perfectionism as a method of survival (Flett & 
Hewitt, 2002). This would tie in with attempts to avoid abuse and establish predictability 
and control in a hostile environment. Flett and Hewitt (2002) report that survivors of 
trauma within a chaotic setting often present with high other-oriented perfectionism as 
adults, due to the wish to compensate for experiences of actual or perceived 
maltreatment in early life. This leads to high expectations regarding the care and support 
they currently expect to receive and can mean they are demanding of others in order to 
get their needs met. 
 
The anxious rearing model proposes that perfectionism may develop from exposure to 




consequences of doing so (Flett & Hewitt, 2002). This can lead to parents being 
overprotective and engendering a sense of „danger‟ in the child of the potential 
emotional and physical consequences of imperfection. Thus, the child attempts to avoid 
the anticipated „threat‟ of making a mistake (including negative evaluation by others) 
and adopts both cognitive and behavioural perfectionistic tendencies. A study by Flett, 
Sherry and Hewitt (2001) demonstrated a significant association between anxious 
parenting and socially prescribed perfectionism, but not self-oriented or other-oriented 
domains. This could fit with the theory that anxious parents expect a lot from their 
children in order to gain some reassurance or „feedback‟ that they are doing a good job. 
These high standards might ultimately leave the child with a sense that others expect 
them to be perfect. 
 
The theories outlined above all tend to focus on parental influence as the key 
environmental factor related to the development of perfectionism. However, it is also 
important to acknowledge the impact of significant others (including peers, teachers and 
the wider family), alongside the cultural and societal pressures influencing development. 
One important peer-related impact on perfectionism is that of bullying; particularly 
during the stage of adolescence in which individuals have elevated levels of self-
consciousness (Flett & Hewitt, 2002). At this time social evaluations and acceptance by 
peers becomes immensely important and socially prescribed perfectionism pressures can 
increase. Bullying can impact on an individual‟s sense of self and they may adopt 
perfectionism as a strategy to overcome low self-esteem; alongside becoming overly 




An example of cultural and societal pressures influencing perfectionism development 
includes cultures that place a large emphasis on physical shape and size as a sign of 
beauty, with the notion that the „perfect‟ body exists and a sense that the thinner an 
individual is, the more attractive and valued they are (Dorian & Garfinkel, 1999).      
This „ideal‟ body image places huge pressures on children growing up, particularly 
young girls who read magazines in which celebrities are criticized and evaluated based 
on their physical shape and size. Individuals may internalise this evaluation and adopt it 
for themselves, developing unhealthy cognitions and behaviours. Thus, cultural and 
societal pressures can also play a significant role in the development of perfectionism. 
 
1.3.2. Individual Influences 
As outlined above, early theorists such as Adler (1956) and Horney (1950) 
conceptualised perfectionism as the child‟s „neurotic‟ reaction to underlying feelings of 
inferiority and insecurity. Whilst undoubtedly the environment in which an individual is 
raised has an impact on these feelings, Adler and Horney appeared to be suggesting it is 
how an individual responds to their environment that determines whether perfectionism 
is adopted or not. They believed this response was influenced by a child‟s temperament 
and individual personality. For example, thinking about attributional style; if an 
individual grows up in a punitive and demanding environment they would need to 
internalise these pressures in order to become a self-oriented perfectionist. However, the 
individual may also externalise these pressures and develop high levels of other-oriented 





Furthermore, introversion versus extroversion and openness to socialisation are 
additionally thought to impact on perfectionism development (Kochanska, 1997). 
Individuals who are more open to socialisation are thought to internalise parental and 
societal values and develop a need for approval by others, alongside the desire to avoid 
negative appraisal; thus heightening perfectionistic tendencies. Flett and Hewitt (2002) 
additionally hypothesised that perfectionists are more likely to present with emotional, 
persistent and fearful temperaments. They proposed the elevated level of sensitivity this 
might create would make individuals more aware of the impact of rewards and 
punishments and thus increasingly concerned about mistakes and failures. 
 
In the process of setting what might be regarded as excessively high standards, an 
individual must also have some sense that they are capable of meeting those standards, 
as it seems unlikely they would wilfully set themselves up to fail. Thus an individual‟s 
perception of their abilities and competencies and indeed their actual skills, are likely to 
play a role in the development of perfectionistic tendencies (Locke, 1996). Flett and 
Hewitt (2002) suggest it therefore follows that an individual will be „most likely to strive 
for personal goals of perfectionism in areas that involve feelings of competence and 
foster the sense that perfection is possible‟ (p.111). However, it also appears possible 
that individuals who feel competent about their abilities in certain areas of life might 
naturally assume this competency will carry over into areas not yet encountered. Thus, 
personal standards might be set in relation to new challenges that are indeed 




help determine „healthy‟ from „unhealthy‟ perfectionists who could have a tendency to 
generalise their perfectionistic standards beyond the realm of their capability. 
 
1.4. Summary and Integration 
A degree of consensus exists when defining perfectionism in that authors generally 
highlight „unrealistic personal standards‟ and „maladaptive evaluation concerns‟ as the 
central factors of the concept; although language differences exist in their descriptions 
(Flett & Hewitt, 2002; Frost et al., 1993; Scott, 2007). Unrealistic personal standards 
include perfection-striving and setting excessively high goals for achievement in various 
areas of life and in relation to thoughts, actions and feelings. For example, individuals 
may place unrealistic demands on themselves to never feel stressed or distressed, 
believing this signifies a failure in coping with life and a sign that they are imperfect or 
flawed. It is the meaning behind imperfection that appears to represent maladaptive 
evaluation concerns, which could be described as the drivers behind high standards. This 
meaning is the impact on an individual‟s self-worth and evaluations include; fear of 
failure, excessive concern over mistakes, overly severe self-evaluations and self-
criticism for anything less than „perfect‟. Thus the drivers keep the striving behaviours 
going as a means of increasing an individual‟s self-worth, enabling them to avoid the 
distress associated with facing perceived flaws.  
 
Perceived flaws can develop during early developmental experiences and through 
interactions with significant others in the ways outlined above (e.g. Bandura, 1986; 




different for various individuals but can result in the same perfectionistic behaviours, 
given the similar impact on self-worth and self-acceptance that experiences appear to 
have. In addition, temperament and individual personality are also thought to play a role 
in the development of perfectionist striving and driving behaviours (Flett & Hewitt, 
2002; Kochanska, 1997). 
 
The interpersonal element of perfectionism described by Hewitt and Flett (1991) and its 
expression is also recognised as important and is thought to depend largely on individual 
temperament and early environmental experiences. Attributional style, social learning 
and individual personality factors (including introversion and extroversion) are all 
thought to affect the origin and direction of perfectionistic behaviour. Hewitt and Flett‟s 
(1991) multidimensional conceptualisation of perfectionism is the clearest in attempting 
to assess where striving and driving behaviours originate and where they are directed, in 
terms of towards self or towards others.  
 
Finally, self-oriented and other-oriented perfectionism have been widely reported as 
significantly positively correlated, with high levels of one dimension existing alongside 
high levels of the other. In addition, mean self-oriented scores are consistently higher 
than other-oriented scores (e.g. Chang, 2006; Flett et al., 2003; Scott, 2007); suggesting 
that distance from the „self‟ might lessen perfectionistic tendencies. However, the 












„Happiness can exist only  





2.1. Acceptance: Definition and Clinical Aspects 
Over the past century, researchers have increasingly focused on the construct of 
acceptance and its relation to psychological health (e.g. Berger, 1952; Hall, 1918; 
Hayes, 2004); however only in recent decades has it been investigated alongside 
perfectionism (Flett et al., 2003). High levels of self-acceptance have been demonstrated 
to protect an individual from the dysfunctional impact of perfectionism (Hamacheck, 
1978). As such, it is important to understand the key features of this construct further.   
 
Early investigations (Adler, 1926; Horney, 1937; Rogers, 1940) led to the identification 
of two specific dimensions of acceptance; self-acceptance and the acceptance of others 
and these were thought to reflect an „awareness of both the positive and negative aspects 
of the self and others, while maintaining an attitude of positive regard‟ (Williams & 
Lynn, 2010, p.6). Furthermore, the focus of acceptance in „third-wave‟ cognitive 
behavioural interventions such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes 
et al., 1999) and Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993) tends to be 
experiential acceptance. This involves non-attachment, non-judgement and embracing of 




Researchers in the field have consistently demonstrated that a lack of acceptance, 
whatever the form, is associated with internal conflict, distress and psychopathology 
(Ferenczi, 1926). This finding has been demonstrated in individuals with eating 
disorders (Wilson, 1996), anxiety disorders (Borkovec et al., 2004) and depression 
(Dobson et al., 2008; Chamberlain & Haaga, 2001), alongside other presentations. 
Furthermore, Carl Rogers (1944) was among the first to identify acceptance as a means 
of „self-actualisation‟ and an important factor in terms of therapeutic change. Hayes 
(1994) expanded this to suggest that „when one gives up on trying to be different, one 
becomes…immediately different in a very profound way‟ (p.20). Therefore a lack of 
acceptance is clearly thought to have a significant role to play in the presence and 
maintenance of psychological distress. 
 
The development of scales by which to measure levels of acceptance led to further 
attempts to define the construct‟s dimensions; namely self-acceptance and the 
acceptance of others. These will now be discussed in further detail below. 
 
2.1.1. Self-Acceptance 
In Berger‟s (1952) work exploring the factors that contribute towards self-acceptance, he 
expanded Sheerer‟s (1949) research to define a self-accepting individual as outlined in 
Table 2.1. This gives a general sense of the factors involved in self-acceptance which 
appear to be an appreciation of individual strengths and weaknesses; valuing of „self‟ 
irrespective of thoughts, feelings, failures or achievements and independent of opinions 




Ellis‟ (1977) Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) and Chamberlain and Haaga 
(2001) developed the Unconditional Self Acceptance Questionnaire (USAQ) to measure 
the construct more accurately. This sense of „intrinsic worth‟ is not affected by high 
standards set by the self or others (Dryden, 1998); therefore it appears possible to have 
perfectionistic tendencies and avoid distress, if unconditional self acceptance is high.  
 
TABLE 2.1: Factors Representing the Self-Accepting Individual (from Berger, 1952) 
The Self-Accepting Person: 
1.  Relies primarily upon internalised values and standards rather than on external pressure as a 
guide for his behaviour. 
2.  Has faith in his capacity to cope with life. 
3.  Assumes responsibility for and accepts the consequences of his own behaviour. 
4.  Accepts praise or criticism from others objectively. 
5.  Does not attempt to deny or distort any feelings, motives, limitations, abilities or favourable 
qualities which he sees in himself, but rather accepts all without self-condemnation. 
6.  Considers himself a person of worth on an equal plane with other persons. 
7.  Does not expect others to reject him whether he gives them any reason to reject him or not. 
8.  Does not regard himself as totally different from others, “queer”, or generally abnormal in his 
reactions. 
9.  Is not shy or self-conscious. 
 
 
A handful of authors have queried the overlap between self-acceptance and self-esteem 
and as such, have conducted research to investigate the concepts further (Chamberlain & 
Haaga, 2001; London, 1997; MacInnes, 2006). Findings suggest there may be a close 
relation between the two concepts; however differences appear to involve general versus 




rating their worth based on measures of self-esteem depends on positive ratings in order 
to feel good about themselves, with negative ratings affecting the degree of self-worth 
recorded. However with measures of self-acceptance, an individual is able to record both 
positive and negative feelings regarding the self and still come out with a score 
reflecting high self-worth if unconditional self-acceptance is high. As such, self-esteem 
is thought to be more variable and related to specific tasks and outcomes; whereas self-
acceptance is more general and stable, although both define one‟s feelings towards the 
self (MacInnes, 2006). 
 
2.1.2. Acceptance of Others 
The second factor thought to make up the construct of „acceptance‟ according to REBT 
is the unconditional acceptance of others. Scott (2007) suggested this was similar to 
Rogers‟ theory of unconditional positive regard; reflecting love, approval and respect for 
others whether or not their behaviour, thoughts and feelings are appropriate, intelligent 
or „correct‟ (Ellis, 1977). Berger‟s (1952) definition of the factors contributing towards 
an individual‟s acceptance of others are outlined in Table 2.2. He used these definitions 
to develop a scale measuring both „self‟ and „other‟ acceptance, which he named the 
Expressed Acceptance of Self and Others Scale (Berger, 1952). Another key scale 
developed around this time was the Acceptance of Self and Others Scale (Fey, 1954). 
These scales both demonstrated good reliability and validity (Fey, 1955; Omwake, 1954) 
and were widely used to investigate the interaction and correlation between self-






TABLE 2.2: Factors Representing the Other-Accepting Individual (from Berger, 1952) 
The Person Who is Accepting of Others: 
1.  Does not reject, hate or pass judgement against other persons when their behaviour or 
standards seem to him to be contradictory to his own. 
2.  Does not attempt to dominate others. 
3.  Does not attempt to assume responsibility for others. 
4.  Does not deny the worth of others or their equality as persons with him. This does not imply 
equality in regard to specific achievements. He feels neither above nor below the people he 
meets. 
5.  Shows a desire to serve others. 
6.  Takes an active interest in others and shows a desire to create mutually satisfactory relations 
with them. 
7.  In attempting to advance his own welfare, he is careful not to infringe on the rights of others. 
 
 
2.2. Self-Acceptance and Acceptance of Others 
Sheerer (1949) was amongst the first to investigate individuals‟ attitudes towards the self 
and others, by observing statements made during recorded counselling sessions. He 
discovered a „definite and substantial correlation‟ between attitudes of respect and 
acceptance for the self and for other people. Although the study was limited by a small 
sample size and the subjective nature of observations, it did pave the way for more 
rigorous research exploring the two constructs. Rogers (1951) additionally proposed that 
an individual‟s self-acceptance is significantly positively correlated with their acceptance 
of others and several authors have since demonstrated comparable findings (Fey, 1954; 





In developing the Expressed Acceptance of Self and Others Scale, Berger (1952) 
concluded that greater confidence could now be held that „expressed self-acceptance is 
positively correlated with expressed acceptance of others‟ (p.781). However; as 
correlations between these two factors ranged from .36 to .69, the relationship also 
appears to have a degree of unpredictability despite the associations.  
 
Fey (1954) suggested that whilst attitudes regarding the self and other people tended to 
„vary together‟, individuals existed who were an exception to this rule. In examining 
these significant differences further, he discovered that individuals with low self-
acceptance and high acceptance of others tended to direct blame and punishment 
towards the „self‟ and put themselves down. Discrepancies in the opposite direction, 
where individuals expressed high self-acceptance and low acceptance of others, 
highlighted a tendency to direct blame and punishment towards others and engage in 
large amounts of projection. Interestingly, Fey (1954) also revealed that these 
participants reported greater resistance to the idea of individual psychotherapy. 
 
Fey followed this research by looking at acceptance of self and others in relation to 
acceptance by others (1955). He used questionnaires measuring self-acceptance, 
acceptance of others and perceived acceptability to others. A sample of 58 third-year 
medical students were recruited and following questionnaire completion the students 
were asked to „list the five of your classmates whom you like best – just as persons‟ 
(Fey, 1955, p.274). This generated an „actual acceptance‟ score, which was then 




acceptance and low acceptance of others scores additionally tended to perceive 
themselves as acceptable to others, but in reality received low „actual acceptance‟ scores 
from others. As in his previous study, Fey suggested these individuals likely 
communicate to other persons their attitude of superiority and intolerance, resulting in 
their own rejection due to being experienced as ego-threatening.  
 
In contrast, individuals with low self-acceptance and high other-acceptance were 
generally well liked. Fey hypothesised this might result from such individuals being 
experienced as less interpersonally threatening and therefore perceived as more 
amenable to others. He reported that the 20 most accepted individuals in his research had 
significantly lower discrepancies between self-acceptance and other-acceptance scores. 
However, he then stated that individuals with high self-acceptance and high acceptance 
of others scores (what he termed the „prototypic well adjusted person‟, p.275) were not 
best liked, explaining that „such a person may not appear to „need‟ friendship, or to 
repay it‟ (Fey, 1955, p.275). His reports are therefore somewhat confusing as these 
individuals surely fall under his definition of persons with a low discrepancy between 
these scores. It appears he must be suggesting that low discrepancies; unless they fall 
towards the top of the scale, mean that individuals are better liked. This matter is 
unfortunately not addressed and Fey concludes by stating „the basic task in any event 
remains that of measuring genuine feelings‟ (p.276). The study is important in this 
respect, as it provides further evidence as to why individuals might distort their actual 





Suinn (1961) further investigated the relationship between self-acceptance and 
acceptance of others, proposing that by identifying named others („father‟ and „teacher‟), 
it might be possible to predict correlations between „self‟ and „other‟ based on degrees 
of similarity. He recruited 82 male high school seniors and used a card sorting task to 
generate self-acceptance, father-acceptance and teacher-acceptance scores by correlating 
„perceived‟ card sorts with „ideal‟ card sorts. Results indicated that self-acceptance 
scores were correlated with father-acceptance (r = .32, p < .005) and teacher-acceptance 
(r = .25, p < .02). Further, as the degree of perceived similarity between self and 
father/teacher increased, the discrepancy between self-acceptance and father/teacher-
acceptance scores significantly decreased. Correlations were -.24  (p = .05) for self-
father comparisons and -.34 (p = .002) for self-teacher comparisons, indicating that 
„perceived similarity significantly influences the generalisation of self-acceptance 
responses‟ (p.40). However; non-significant results were gained when „degree of 
involvement‟ was compared with generalisation. This may have occurred because Suinn 
assumed participants were more involved with their fathers than with their teachers, 
which might not have been the case. Alternatively, it could be that perceived similarity 
influences the degree to which self-acceptance and acceptance of others scores are 
correlated; however level of involvement with the significant other does not. 
 
Finally, Zelen (1954) used the Bonney Sociometric Assessment (Bonney, 1943), the 
Feelings of Personal Worth subscale of the California Test of Personality (Clark et al., 
1953) and the Who-Are-You? technique (Bugental & Zelen, 1950), to assess peer status, 




that self-acceptance demonstrated significant correlations with acceptance by others, but 
not with acceptance of others. However, this finding may result from the young age of 
the participants studied. Suinn (1961) reports that the younger the sample, the lower the 
correlations found between self and other acceptance. As such, this contrasts with the 
significant correlations observed in older age research groups (e.g. Fey, 1954; Williams, 
1962). 
 
It therefore could be that something resembling a „critical point‟ in development might 
occur, following which an individual‟s self-concept may become more stable. Before 
this point, „self‟ and „other‟ acceptance appear to be somewhat unrelated; however once 
this point has been reached, an individual‟s self-acceptance and their acceptance of 
others become more significantly related. Exceptions to this rule exist and factors such 
as perceived similarity between self and others may affect the evaluations made. Suinn 
(1961) suggests that the greater the similarity, the more accepting an individual is of 
others. Given these findings, it could be said that the „self‟ becomes the reference point 
from which perceptions and attitudes towards others originate. Indeed, Sullivan (1947) 
first suggested; if an individual‟s relation with themselves is largely critical, this will 
promote unfavourable and derogatory evaluations of other people. This would therefore 
also explain the significant correlation between self-oriented and other-oriented 
perfectionism dimensions, as discussed in Chapter 1. 
 
Despite this degree of clarity, the precise factors influencing variation in the degree of 




be that interactions occur with additional personality constructs which influence the 
results gained and as such, exploring the relationship between acceptance and 
perfectionism in further detail may prove useful. 
 
2.3. Acceptance and Perfectionism  
Given the important role that self-acceptance is thought to play in „protecting‟ 
perfectionistic individuals from distress; only a handful of studies have explored the 
specific interaction in detail (Flett et al., 2003; Lundh, 2004; Scott, 2007). As yet, 
acceptance of others has not been studied alongside perfectionism; however clinical 
observations of perfectionists historically suggested their self-acceptance was somewhat 
„conditional‟ depending on whether specific targets and standards were met (Flett et al., 
2003). This association between low levels of unconditional self-acceptance and high 
levels of perfectionism led authors to wonder which factor might be affecting the other 
and several authors have investigated this further.  
 
Flett and colleagues (2003) used a student sample to demonstrate that unconditional self-
acceptance, as measured by the USAQ (Chamberlain & Haaga, 2001), was significantly 
negatively associated with all three perfectionism dimensions, as measured by the MPS 
(Hewitt & Flett, 1991). In addition, they reported that unconditional self-acceptance 
mediated the relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism and depression      
(Z = 2.13, p = .03) but not the two other perfectionism dimensions. However, they 
demonstrated that other-oriented perfectionism was associated indirectly with 




was then associated with depression. This study was limited in that Flett and colleagues 
did not explore associations utilising perfectionism as the potential mediator and simply 
assumed self-acceptance as the mediating factor.  
 
In contrast, Horney (1950) and Hollender‟s (1965) conceptualisation of perfectionism as 
a means by which insecure individuals can consider themselves acceptable, suggests that 
perfectionism is „adopted‟ as a way to overcome underlying low self-acceptance. As 
such, this model proposes perfectionism as the mediating factor between low self-
acceptance and depression. Scott (2007) investigated this relationship further in an effort 
to determine whether perfectionism or unconditional self-acceptance had a mediating or 
moderating influence in associations with depression. His study included 134 non-
clinical participants who completed the MPS (Hewitt & Flett, 1991), the Perfectionism 
Questionnaire (Rhéaume et al., 1995), the USAQ (Chamberlain & Haaga, 2001) and the 
Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Inventory (Radloff, 1977). Scott firstly 
demonstrated that unconditional self-acceptance and all measures of perfectionism were 
significantly associated with each other and also with depression. He then used path 
analysis to determine the mediating effects of perfectionism and unconditional self-
acceptance and explored the relative „drop‟ in the path directly between the predictor 
and depression in order to determine the greater mediator. He identified the „drop‟ 
(indicating the degree of mediation) as being larger when unconditional self-acceptance 
was the mediator and perfectionism the predictor (47.5% and 46.5% drop) as opposed to 
when perfectionism was the mediator and unconditional self-acceptance the predictor 




unconditional self-acceptance appeared to have mediating properties, unconditional self-
acceptance was the more effective mediator. His study consisted of a large number of 
females (N = 104) in comparison to males (N = 30) and based findings purely on self-
report measures; however Scott was able to demonstrate that perfectionism was likely to 
be the „core construct‟ which subsequently impacted on levels of unconditional self-
acceptance. This led Scott to propose that the development of perfectionism differs from 
its operation and he hypothesised that his study and others like it had measured the 
current „operation‟ of perfectionism; thus explaining perfectionism as the factor 
influencing self-acceptance.  
 
If this were accurate, perfectionistic tendencies (P) might thus develop as a means to 
overcome low self-acceptance (SA) and poor self-worth that arises during childhood 
(Section 1.3). As such, individuals might strive for perfection and set high standards to 
try to prove their worth and gain acceptance from self and others (low SA → high P). In 
cases where this does not occur, or an individual experiences „failure‟; self-acceptance 
may become reinforced as contingent on performance and individuals might strive 
harder to prove their worth and escape feelings of distress. This reflects the operational 
nature of perfectionism; „perfection‟ is rarely attained, yet an individual is caught in 
striving to achieve it and as a result, self-acceptance may diminish further (high P → 
low SA). At this stage the negative impact of perfectionism has a greater influence on 
self-acceptance than vice versa, although its developmental function may still persist. 
This reflects Scott‟s (2007) finding that both perfectionism and unconditional self-




acceptance is more effective. As Scott suggests, this theory is somewhat „speculative‟ 
and further research would help to clarify its validity; however it appears to draw 
existing research together in a way that indicates it might prove useful.  
 
2.4. Summary and Integration 
Empirical evidence suggests that unconditional self-acceptance is important in 
moderating the relationship between perfectionism and distress (Scott, 2007). As such, it 
is believed the counterproductive and dysfunctional effects of perfectionism can be 
reduced if self-acceptance is also high. However, the majority of existing research 
demonstrates that dimensions of perfectionism are generally associated with lower levels 
of self-acceptance (Ellis, 2002; Flett et al., 2002); meaning a „contingent‟ sense of self-
worth is likely to be a core feature of perfectionism. Whether this stems from a 
developmental approach, where perfectionism is adopted as a means to overcome low 
self-acceptance; or an operational approach, where striving behaviours and maladaptive 
self-evaluations lower self-acceptance given that perfection is rarely attainable, is 
difficult to ascertain. Both approaches have generated a level of support and Scott 
(2007) suggests that perhaps both are plausible at different stages in the lifecycle, if the 
development of perfectionism differs from its present operation.  
 
Furthermore, the relationship between self-acceptance and acceptance of others appears 
to be somewhat complicated. According to published findings, the two constructs are 
significantly positively correlated the majority of the time (e.g. Berger, 1952; Fey, 1954; 




reflecting high self-acceptance and low acceptance of others and vice-versa. These 
significant differences could be explained by the extent of adversity an individual 
experiences in early life; meaning that severe abuse or neglect might lead to an 
increasingly fragmented sense of „self‟ and „other‟ developing. Where internal working 
models become fragmented it can be difficult for individuals to fully integrate their 
experiences, due to difficulties with reflecting and mentalising capacities (Crittenden, 
1992); thus significant differences in self-acceptance and acceptance of others scores 
may result. 
 
Further explanations for this difference may lie with attribution theory, if the impact on 
self-worth and the worth of others depends on whether events and feelings are 
internalised or externalised and to what extent (Weiner, 1992). Significant levels of 
externalisation might thus lead to significant differences between „self‟ and „other‟ 
scores. In addition, the degree of difference between perceived self and perceived other 
may explain the varied findings, in that larger differences could mean larger 
discrepancies between self and other acceptance scores (Suinn, 1961). Finally, it is 
possible an individual with low self-acceptance could learn to become highly accepting 
of others as a means of overcoming their low self-worth. In this way, being highly 
accepting of others might make an individual more amenable to others, increasing 
popularity, decreasing rejection and allowing individuals to feel temporarily more 
acceptable to themselves. These theories all provide potential explanations for the 
significant differences observed between reported levels of self-acceptance and 




does demonstrate significant positive correlations between the two dimensions; and 
individual acceptance of others scores are generally higher than self-acceptance scores. 
 
As Fey (1955) astutely concluded, the important factor in understanding differences 
between self and other dimensions of both acceptance and perfectionism „remains that of 
measuring genuine feelings‟ and as such, the measurement of implicit beliefs will now 










„The fact a person denies that he is theorising  
is no reason for taking him at his word  
and failing to investigate what implicit theory  






In the literature reviewed so far, the differences between reported beliefs for self and 
others in terms of perfectionism and acceptance are at times unclear. Self-acceptance is 
generally positively correlated with acceptance of others; however research has also 
demonstrated exceptions to this rule (Fey, 1954). Furthermore, whilst self and other-
oriented perfectionism are generally significantly correlated; the degree of correlation 
varies and indeed the interaction of other-oriented perfectionism with depression 
generates somewhat inconsistent results. At times it is associated with higher levels of 
depression (Hewitt et al., 1998; Scott, 2007); whereas other studies report its association 
with lower levels of depression (Chang & Sanna, 2001); and yet further studies indicate 
the lack of any significant association with depression (Flett at al., 1996). These mixed 
results could be interpreted in numerous ways, one of which might query the honesty of 
respondents in reporting their underlying beliefs regarding perfectionism.  
 
The implicit measurement of perfectionism and acceptance has not yet been attempted, 




(2004) discovered that in general the self was contrasted with the other; so that when the 
other was „positive‟, fewer positive self-associations were made, and when the other was 
„negative‟, fewer negative associations with the self were made. As such, an implicit 
understanding of perfectionism and acceptance for self and others may prove useful in 
attempting to explain the observed differences that exist utilising explicit measures. 
 
3.2. Implicit Beliefs 
In recent decades, cognitive scientists have become increasingly interested in 
understanding preconscious processes in a robust and scientific manner. Thus, the 
evidence-base regarding what lies outside of conscious awareness and control has grown 
significantly. Wegner (2002) highlighted the limited control that individuals actually 
possess over their own thoughts; and other researchers have similarly demonstrated the 
fragility of human introspection (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Furthermore, questionnaires 
that rely solely on self-reported attitudes and beliefs necessarily assume that individuals 
are motivated to report their internal states honestly; an assumption that has been 
unsupported by several authors (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
 
These insights have increased efforts amongst researchers in the field to develop a 
suitable „tool‟ by which implicit cognitions can be measured, thus bypassing the need 
for both accurate introspection and adequate honesty. As a result, several tasks have 
been developed including the evaluative priming technique (Fazio et al., 1986), the 
Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998), the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task 




et al., 2006). These tasks all require judgements to be made about a range of presented 
stimuli and rely on response-latencies to determine individuals‟ underlying beliefs and 
attitudes (Albarracin et al., 2005). A brief overview of these procedures will now follow. 
 
The evaluative priming technique (Fazio et al., 1986) involves participants first being 
presented with an „attitude prime‟ (e.g. spinach) and then a „target word‟ that changes 
across trials (e.g. pleasant, awful, etc.). Their task is to decide whether the meaning of 
the target word represents „good‟ or „bad‟ by pressing the relevant response key. The 
technique aims to determine whether an evaluation is made in relation to the attitude 
prime. Thus, if response latency for positive adjectives (e.g. pleasant) is faster than for 
negative adjectives (e.g. awful), this is thought to indicate a positive evaluation of the 
attitude prime (e.g. spinach). If response latency is faster for negative adjectives, then a 
negative evaluation regarding the „prime‟ is thought to have been made (Albarracin et 
al., 2005). 
 
Livingston and Brewer (2002) suggested the nature of the priming stimulus has a large 
impact on what is captured by the procedure and the generalisability of the attitude 
prime. For example, individuals primed with African-American faces during a procedure 
to assess racial stereotypes had faster response latencies for negative adjectives when 
„prototypical‟ faces were presented, in contrast to when less prototypical faces were 
presented (Livingston & Brewer, 2002). Indeed, when participants were instructed only 
to attend to the race of the faces presented, the difference in response latencies based on 




knowing whether a specific prime can fully capture an individual‟s evaluation of the 
wider category represented by the prime. Thus, the evaluative priming technique appears 
somewhat unsophisticated when attempting to gauge the precise features of a prime that 
an individual is responding to. 
 
The Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) also seeks to measure 
implicit attitudes by determining underlying automatic evaluations; however it goes 
about this in a slightly different way. Its main assumption is that „associations [between 
concepts] can be revealed by mapping two discrimination tasks alternately onto a single 
pair of responses‟ (Greenwald et al., 1998, p.1469). Participants are required to press a 
response key (left or right), which has previously been assigned to a category of 
discrimination, for example; „flower‟, „insect‟, „pleasant‟ or „unpleasant‟ (Greenwald et 
al., 1998). Greenwald and colleagues demonstrated that when one key represented 
„flower‟ and „pleasant‟ and another key „insect‟ and „unpleasant‟ (associated categories), 
reaction times were faster when words corresponding to these categories were presented 
(e.g. „rose‟, „bee‟, „happy‟, „rotten‟). Conversely, when one key represented „flower‟ and 
„unpleasant‟ and the other key „insect‟ and „pleasant‟ (less associated categories), 
reaction times were longer. This research demonstrated that for most people flowers are 
positive and insects are negative; hence the difference in reaction times. This procedure 
has been used to expose a range of implicit attitudes based on the association between 
categories of words, such as race (Greenwald et al., 2002), gender (Greenwald et al., 





The IAT has displayed adequate internal consistency, with reported scores ranging from 
.7 to .9 (Greenwald & Nosek, 2001; Schmukle & Egloff, 2004) and satisfactory test-
retest reliability (Egloff et al., 2005); both of which can be difficult to achieve for 
implicit measures. However, as a tool for accessing implicit beliefs, the focus of the IAT 
on associations between concepts has been criticised by several researchers                
(De Houwer, 2002; de Jong et al., 2001). They claim that factors more complex than 
simple „associations‟ are involved in understanding human beliefs and cognitions. For 
example in Greenwald‟s research above, the difference in reaction times could 
theoretically mean that individuals find both flowers and insects pleasant; but that 
flowers are preferred over insects. Thus, the particular relation (or „direction‟ of 
association) between concepts cannot be determined by the IAT (De Houwer, 2002).  
 
Critics also report that conditional beliefs (such as „if I can‟t do things perfectly then I‟m 
a complete failure‟) involve a range of specific associations and a range of concepts that 
the IAT is unlikely to be able to capture (de Jong et al., 2001). As such, the IAT is 
described as only providing „indirect evidence‟ for the existence of certain beliefs. 
(Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006). Finally as De Houwer (2001) points out, the IAT does not 
have a cognitive model to explain performance on the task. 
 
A team of researchers thus attempted to address these deficits and produce an implicit 
measure that was theoretically grounded and able to assess complex beliefs by 
measuring relations between stimuli and events (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2000). They 




Relational Evaluation Procedure; before Barnes-Holmes and a separate set of colleagues 
(2006) adapted this to form the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP). Given 
the reported superiority of the IRAP as an implicit measure, it was adopted to assess 
perfectionism and acceptance beliefs in the present research. As such, a brief overview 
of RFT will now follow in order to understand the basis for the IRAP procedure further. 
 
3.3. Relational Frame Theory 
Relational Frame Theory (Hayes et al., 2001) was proposed to understand the role of 
language in the control and regulation of behaviour. It is based on behavioural principles 
and provides a framework for capturing how language is learnt through interactions with 
the environment. Its main concept is „arbitrarily applied derived relational responding‟ 
(Blackledge, 2003) and this will now be described further.  
 
3.3.1. Relational Responding 
RFT proposes that stimulus relations are a key feature of human learning and that 
sophisticated language and cognitive abilities mean such relations are frequently 
complex. Stimuli include cognitions, emotions, behaviours, physiological sensations, 
semantics, environments and objects. Any one learning experience is thus „framed‟ by a 
range of elements and the relation between these elements can subsequently influence 
behaviour in a different context. This occurs as the activation of one element from the 
initial framing experience means that other elements are also „triggered‟, given the 
particular relations framing learning in the first instance (Blackledge, 2003). RFT 




opposition, distinction and hierarchy (Hayes et al., 2001). For example, the situation 
depicted in Figure 3.1 is a proposed relational network that might explain the factors 















FIGURE 3.1: Proposed Network to Explain the Factors Relating to Perfectionistic Striving  
(H = Hierarchy, C = Coordination, Ca = Causation) 
 
This depicts an individual who uses perfectionistic striving as a means to overcome the 
fear of failing or making a mistake at work. The individual‟s early environment may 
have been one in which they received a large amount of criticism and „negative 














































standards‟ were met. The presence of these three factors could be theorised to form the 
basis for low or conditional self-acceptance. In addition, the relation between failure and 
mistakes as „dangerous‟ and things to be afraid of might occur if a range of „negative 
consequences‟, such as physical abuse, took place during childhood. In the diagram 
above, the relations of hierarchy, coordination, and causation framing these early 
learning experiences meant that stimulus „functions‟ became related. These relations 
(e.g. failure is dangerous) were then reinforced over time during different learning 
experiences. The relation of coordination depicts rough equivalence between the five 
stimuli and both „fear‟ and „failure/mistakes‟. This demonstrates how an individual at 
work in the present day might feel afraid and strive for perfection when „high standards‟ 
are set, even if „failure‟ would not actually result in „negative consequences‟, for 
example. The presence of the „high standards‟ stimuli thus carries the function of the 
other stimuli due to previous relational framing (Blackledge, 2003).  
 
However, it is also possible that an individual has never experienced personal failure 
directly and the transfer of stimulus function between fear and failure/mistakes has 
occurred through other framing experiences. This could include observing negative 
consequences for another person and feeling afraid; hearing stories about negative 
consequences for others, alongside parental views of self or others when mistakes have 
been made. As discussed in Chapter 1, it is also possible that an overprotective parent 
who is afraid of failure/mistakes might engender a sense of fear in an individual that 
intolerable outcomes will occur if mistakes are made. Thus an individual can develop a 




to the generation of perfectionistic tendencies. Furthermore, transfer of stimulus function 
can take place when framing relates elements that have never been directly or indirectly 
encountered by anybody before. Blackledge (2003) defines all these examples as 
„derived relational responding‟, which is the presence of a response in the absence of 
directly reinforced learning.  
 
Stimulus relations are additionally proposed to be bi-directional; meaning that the 
transfer of stimulus function can occur both before and after a learning event has 
occurred. For example, the framing of failure and mistakes with fear can occur either 
before or after the „failure‟ takes place. According to RFT, this „mutual entailment‟ is 
attributable to human language and sets us aside from other animals who are thought to 
only have the capacity for unidirectional relating (Catania, 1998).  
 
In RFT, stimulus relations are also thought to be organised in terms of aspects of 
equivalence (Blackledge, 2003). This is when the qualities and functions of a stimulus 
are related; for example „high standards‟ is equivalent to being „demanding‟ in the right 
context. Furthermore, „I/me‟ might be related to „others‟ if the properties defining both 
individuals are regarded as equivalent or similar. Thus „others are useless‟ might also be 
present in the framing example in Figure 3.1 and perfectionistic striving may be directed 
towards others. Equivalence relations also take place when individuals learn that a 
spoken word, for example “failure”, is the same as the written word FAILURE, which is 
the same as actual failure and also a picture of „failure‟. These relations of equivalence 




that takes place (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2004). For example, a child might first learn that 
the meaning of the spoken word “failure” and a picture of „failure‟ share the equivalent 
stimulus properties. If they then learn how to spell FAILURE, framing of this learning 
with the spoken word would also transfer the aspects of the written word onto a picture 
of „failure‟, given the earlier „equivalence‟ framing that took place. 
 
Derived relational responding also includes „more than‟ and „less than‟ stimulus 
relations. At this level of complexity the relational framing is thought to be controlled by 
„more‟ and „less‟ contextual cues rather than the formal properties of an object (Barnes 
& Roche, 1996). For example, if an individual is described as someone‟s „little brother‟ 
despite being several inches taller in physical size, it can be deduced that the person 
doing the describing is the elder sibling. This comparison goes beyond the boundary of 
physicality (a formal/non-arbitrary property) and involves a derived relation. As such, it 
is termed „arbitrarily applied derived relational responding‟; the key concept of RFT 
(Blackledge, 2003).  
 
Finally, according to RFT, the hierarchical relationships in Figure 3.1 signify that the 
individual („I/me‟) is within the „work‟ setting and thus correspondingly the work setting 
contains the individual. Furthermore, the failure or mistake is within the work setting 
and as such, fear and perfectionistic striving may only exist in this context and not 
elsewhere. Within this framing, „fear‟ and thoughts such as “I‟m useless” become the 
antecedents to increasing „perfectionistic striving‟. Alternative behaviours, including 




useless given the „high expectations‟ in the work setting. This could be particularly 
relevant for those with mental health difficulties whose symptoms, such as poor 
concentration, might lead to the occurrence of mistakes and thus heighten fear levels. 
Earlier framing experiences would activate negative thoughts, such as „I‟m useless‟, 
which may then result in absence from work if this seems to be the only way of escaping 
such thoughts. 
 
This arbitrarily applied derived relational responding, as outlined by RFT is thought to 
be „an ongoing way of responding to stimuli as they are presented‟ (Blackledge, 2003, 
p.429). As such, „framing‟ is thought to occur continuously throughout an individual‟s 
life and is hypothesised to be „a function of their extensive learning history and 
stimulation in the present environment‟ (Blackledge, 2003, p.429). Authors suggest that 
RFT processes are directly observable in terms of subsequent behaviour; and empirical 
research has consistently supported its principles (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2001; Clayton, 
1995; Hayes et al., 2001). Thus, it appears to be an adequate theory to explain the role of 
language in the control and regulation of behaviour. 
 
3.4. The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure 
Following the development of RFT, its theoretical grounding led to the generation of the 
Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006) as a more 
robust tool for measuring implicit beliefs. In addition, its ability to measure specific 
relations between stimuli suggests it is a more accurate measure of beliefs than earlier 




The IRAP is similar to the IAT in terms of utilising response-key options to various 
onscreen presentations; however screen setup is slightly different so that specific 
relations (e.g. same as, different, hierarchical, temporal, spatial, etc.) between the stimuli 
can be recorded. Twenty-four screen presentations or „trials‟ make up one block of the 
IRAP, which in total consists of two practice blocks and six test blocks. In each trial, 
participants are presented with a „sample‟ stimulus at the top of the screen (e.g. 
„pleasant‟ or „unpleasant‟), a „target‟ stimulus in the middle, reflecting words from each 
of the sample stimulus categories (e.g. „love‟ or „abuse‟) and two relational response 
options at the bottom of the screen (e.g. „similar‟ and „opposite‟). For example, in 
Barnes-Holmes and colleagues 2006 study, screen presentations appeared as displayed 








Figure 3.2: Sample Screen Presentations from the IRAP  
(Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006) 
 
Participants were instructed to respond in a „consistent‟ or „inconsistent‟ manner 
depending on which test block they were in. As such, it was possible to give a correct or 
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though the target stimulus was consistent with the sample stimulus, in order to progress 
on to the following screen. For example, in Figure 3.2 participants pressed the „similar‟ 
key meaning that pleasant and love were similar to each other. In inconsistent blocks, 
responses inconsistent with the sample stimulus (and typically individuals‟ beliefs) were 
required; so in Figure 3.2 the „opposite‟ key was pressed meaning that pleasant and love 
were opposite to each other. All four words remained onscreen until the correct key was 
pressed and a gap of 400ms separated trials. If an incorrect response was given, for 
example a participant in an inconsistent block pressed the „similar‟ key in Figure 3.2, a 
red „X‟ appeared on the screen below the target word. Participants were then required to 
press the alternative response key to give the correct response, before they could 
progress on to the next trial. 
 
Twelve target words were used, six „pleasant‟ and six „unpleasant‟ words. The order of 
sample and target stimulus presentations was randomised across trials with the limitation 
that each target word appeared twice, once in the presence of „pleasant‟ and once with 
„unpleasant‟. Likewise, the „similar‟ and „opposite‟ response keys shifted randomly 
between the left and right positions on screen (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006). Finally, test 
blocks alternated in the order of consistent-inconsistent, or inconsistent-consistent 
depending on whether participants were allocated to „consistent-relations-first‟ or 
„inconsistent-relations-first‟ test groups. 
 
Response latencies were recorded and Barnes-Holmes and colleagues (2006) were able 




trials; thus demonstrating the IRAP was a suitable tool for measuring spontaneous and 
automatic evaluations of stimuli. The same procedure has also demonstrated significant 
effects with more socially sensitive attitudes, such as ageism (Cullen et al., 2009), sexual 
preferences of offenders (Dawson et al., 2009), racial stereotyping (Barnes-Holmes et 
al., 2010), self-esteem in prisoners (Vahey et al., 2009) and attitudes to autism (Barnes-
Holmes et al., 2006); thus the evidence base for its use is growing. Furthermore, 
findings are increasingly interesting when beliefs reported in explicit measures contrast 
with those identified during the IRAP procedure.  
 
The RFT explanation of the IRAP effect has recently been described as the Relational 
Evaluation and Coherence (REC) model (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010) and this accounts 
for the difference in response times across consistent and inconsistent trials. The IRAP 
procedure is thought to produce an „immediate relational response‟ based on stimuli 
presented onscreen. Thus in trials where the required response is consistent with an 
individual‟s immediate relational response, reaction times are faster. However in trials 
where the required response contrasts with an individual‟s immediate relational 
response, reaction times are longer as it takes an increased length of time to „override‟ 
the immediate response and press the correct key.  
 
Thus implicit beliefs as measured by the IRAP rely on participants responding as 
quickly as possible to trials and a red „too slow‟ warning has recently been added to the 
IRAP procedure (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010). This pops up onscreen beneath the target 




limit. When individuals have longer to think about their response; such as when 
completing self-report measures, their „elaborated relational responding‟ means socially 
acceptable and carefully considered responses are given. As such, this explains the 
difference that is frequently observed between an individual‟s implicit and explicit 
recording of beliefs (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010). 
 
3.5. Summary and Integration 
The implicit measurement of perfectionism and acceptance may be important in further 
understanding these constructs, given the variation that exists within the literature 
reviewed thus far. The IRAP task is considered the most appropriate tool for this 
purpose, due to its grounding in a theoretical model (RFT) and its ability to measure 
specific relations between stimuli and not just associations (Barnes-Holmes et al., 
2006). As perfectionism and acceptance have not yet been investigated implicitly, the 
present research is largely exploratory in its anticipated findings. However, 
understandings generated so far mean that a number of predictions can be made 
regarding interactions between the implicit and explicit measurement of these constructs.  
 
Given that humans are fundamentally social beings who seek to form close relationships 
with others, it may be that those high in other-oriented perfectionism, or low in 
acceptance of others (based on previous learning experiences), might suppress these 
beliefs or fail to acknowledge them consciously if they wish to interact with others. 
Research outlined above suggests the social impact of revealing other-oriented 




consciously or unconsciously cover up these beliefs in attempt to appear more amenable 
to others. As such, differences between implicit and explicit scores may be observed. 
 
In terms of self-oriented perfectionism, it could be speculated that the impossibility of 
achieving „perfection‟ and the detrimental impact of having unrealistic personal 
standards is increasingly becoming common knowledge. Thus, a highly self-
perfectionistic individual might be unwilling to explicitly present themselves as such, 
because doing so could be seen as acknowledging an imperfection; possessing a quality 
that frequently proves itself to be a hindrance. Once again, this may lead to observable 
differences between implicit and explicit measures. 
 
Reported self-acceptance is a similar matter. It could be said that under-reporting beliefs 
regarding favourable evaluation of the self demonstrates non-acceptance of a personality 
feature; therefore truly self-accepting individuals may not carry this out. However, 
taking the common example of individuals stating “not to be big-headed, but…”, it 
appears that down-playing self-accepting beliefs is common practice. This might be 
particularly true for cultures valuing modesty and humility and again suggests it is a 
mechanism employed, consciously or otherwise, to increase one‟s favourableness in the 
eyes of others. As such, it is believed differences may exist between implicit and explicit 








In accordance with the literature reviewed above, several hypotheses were made relating 
to the factors under investigation in the current study. It was hypothesised that: 
1. Scores will be higher for self-oriented perfectionism than for other-oriented 
perfectionism on both explicit and implicit measures. 
2. Scores will be higher for acceptance of others than for self-acceptance on both 
explicit and implicit measures. 
3. Self-oriented perfectionism will be negatively correlated with self-acceptance on 
explicit measures. 
4. Perfectionism for others will be negatively correlated with acceptance of others 
on explicit measures.  
5. Implicit scores for self-oriented perfectionism, other-oriented perfectionism, self-
acceptance and acceptance of others will not be associated with explicit scores. 
 
Furthermore, secondary aims of the research included: 
1. Relationships between perfectionism and acceptance for self and others on 
implicit measures will be explored. 
2. Relationships between perfectionism, acceptance and general health will be 










„Art and science have their  
meeting point in method‟  
 
(Edward G. Bulwer-Lytton) 
 
 
4.1. Research Design 
The research design involved a descriptive cross-sectional factorial design (2 x 2 x 2) 
consisting of three within-subjects variables. These were personality construct             
(2: perfectionism, acceptance), perspective taken (2: self, other) and method of 
measurement (2: explicit, implicit). The dependent variables were response latencies in 
the IRAP task (implicit data) and recorded scores from the four self-report measures 
(explicit data). All parts of the study were quantitative in design. For the hypotheses 
outlined above, a-priori power analyses (Cohen, 1992; Pezzullo, 2010) illustrated that 
for a repeated measures t-test (within groups) design where α = .05; a sample size of     
N = 35 was required to have 80% power to detect a medium effect size (d = .50). 
Whereas for correlation matrix analyses where α = .05, a sample size of N = 85 was 
necessary to detect a moderate effect or larger (r = .30). As such, in order to ensure 
adequate power for all hypotheses, the sample size required for this research was N = 85. 
 
4.2. Participants 
Ethical approval was gained from the University of Edinburgh‟s Clinical Psychology 




courses at the university during the study period of October 2010 to June 2011, were 
recruited. As the study was largely exploratory in design, university students were an 
ideal population from which to gather initial data. In addition, many students have 
reported evaluative pressures as a prominent aspect of the university experience 
(Vredenburg et al., 1993); therefore the constructs investigated may have been 
particularly pertinent for this population.  
 
The sample consisted of 99 native English-language speaking students (56 females and 
43 males), with a mean age of 25.46 (SD = 6.84). Participants were approached via 
school administrators who forwarded an email to all undergraduate and postgraduate 
students in the schools of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences (PPLS), 
Economics, Informatics, Biological Sciences and Geosciences. Other schools were 
contacted within the College of Humanities and Social Science and the College of 
Science and Engineering; however they either did not reply or would not permit an 
email to be sent to their students. The forwarded email contained a brief overview of the 
study alongside an attachment of the participant information sheet (see Appendix B) and 
asked students who wished to participate to email the lead researcher at the address 
given. Individuals with significant uncorrected visual or motor impairment and those 
who were non-native English-language speakers were excluded from the study due to 
the requirements of the implicit task. A suitable time for all appropriate volunteers to 






4.3. Potential Ethical Issues 
Informed consent was gained before participants completed the research procedure and 
individuals were advised they could withdraw from the study at any time without having 
to give a reason (see Appendix C). Participants were encouraged to take at least 24 hours 
to decide whether or not to take part and indeed the next available research slot was 
frequently two weeks in advance; therefore adequate time was allowed for participants 
to withdraw from the study if desired.  
 
The questionnaires used in this study were designed to measure specific personality 
features and access personal information, including individual‟s relationships with 
others and their particular feelings and beliefs. The potential negative effects of 
prompting participants to think about such aspects of themselves were managed by 
ensuring adequate de-briefing took place following research completion. Any 
detrimental impact of the research was assessed and a handful of individuals who 
revealed previous or current mental health difficulties (including stress, depression and 
an eating disorder), were reminded about external sources of support and encouraged to 
access them if necessary. 
 
All data gathered during the research process remained confidential and limits to 
confidentiality in terms of risk to self or others were made clear in the participant 
information sheet. All data collected throughout the study was anonymised and coded 
with unique identifiers. It was kept secure at all times and additionally, data stored 






Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (MPS; Hewitt & Flett, 1991). The MPS is a 45-
item self-report inventory designed to assess Perfectionism across three dimensions of 
15 items each. Dimensions include self-oriented perfectionism (MPS-Self; e.g. „It is 
very important that I am perfect in everything I attempt‟), other-oriented perfectionism 
(MPS-Other; e.g. „Everything that others do must be of top-notch quality‟), and socially 
prescribed perfectionism (e.g. „The people around me expect me to succeed at 
everything I do‟). The latter dimension was omitted from analysis in the present 
investigation as it was not considered relevant. Respondents rate the extent of their 
agreement with each item on a seven-point likert scale ranging from 1 (disagree) to 7 
(agree). This questionnaire does not have a total perfectionism score, however higher 
scores on each subscale represent greater levels of perfectionism within a dimension. 
The MPS is a well-established measure that has been used on a range of clinical and 
non-clinical samples, demonstrating good reliability and validity (e.g. Frost et al., 1993; 
Hall et al., 2009; Hewitt & Flett, 1991). In the present study Cronbach‟s alpha was .93 
and .86 for SOP and OOP correspondingly. 
 
Unconditional Self-Acceptance Questionnaire (USAQ; Chamberlain & Haaga, 2001). 
The USAQ is a 20-item self-report measure designed to assess various aspects of 
unconditional self-acceptance, a concept developed in rational-emotive behaviour 
therapy (Chamberlain & Haaga, 2001). It includes items such as „Being bad at certain 




disapprove of me‟ (see Appendix D). Individuals rate the extent of their agreement with 
each item on a seven-point likert scale ranging from 1 (almost always untrue) to 7 
(almost always true). The scale has 11 reverse-scored items and has demonstrated good 
psychometric properties (α = .72; Chamberlain & Haaga, 2001). In the current study, 
Cronbach‟s alpha was .72. 
 
Acceptance of Others Scale (AOS; Fey, 1955). The AOS scale is a 20-item self-report 
questionnaire designed to assess individuals‟ levels of other-acceptance (Fey, 1955). It 
includes items such as „I can enjoy being with people whose values are very different 
from mine‟ and „People are too self-centred‟ (see Appendix E). Individuals rate their 
agreement with each item on a five-point likert scale ranging from 1 (almost always 
true) to 5 (very rarely true). The scale has five reverse-scored items and scaled scores 
range from 20 (low acceptance of others) to 100 (high acceptance of others). The AOS 
has good internal consistency (α = .90; Fey, 1955) and Cronbach‟s alpha in this study 
was .86. 
 
General Health Questionnaire - 12 item version (GHQ; Goldberg, 1978). The GHQ is a 
12-item self-report questionnaire that assesses the severity of mental health difficulty 
over the past few weeks. It includes items such as „Have you recently been able to 
concentrate on whatever you‟re doing?‟ and „Have you recently been losing confidence 
in yourself?‟ Individuals rate their agreement with each item on a four-point scale of 
severity (e.g. „not at all‟ to „much more than usual‟). The scale has six reverse-scored 




health. The GHQ has been widely validated and found to have good psychometric 
properties (Hankins, 2008). In this sample, internal consistency was very good 
(Cronbach‟s alpha = .86). 
 
Implicit Measures 
Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006). The 
IRAP is a computer-based means of measuring unreported and „automatic‟ beliefs (see 
Section 3.4 above). Participants are asked to respond quickly and accurately to confirm 
or deny a specific belief or attitude, based on the relation between the stimulus presented 
(e.g. „To Self‟ + „Critical‟ = „Yes‟ or „No‟?). The IRAP differs from other implicit 
measures in that it directs participants to respond in a particular way according to 
„expected‟ relations for a block of trials, rather than requesting responses based on 
individuals‟ own beliefs. The speed of response then enables participants‟ beliefs to be 
identified, as responding should be faster when an individual is prompted to respond in a 
way that is actually consistent with their own beliefs. IRAP effects have been 
demonstrated across various psychological phenomena, including attitudes to 
homosexuality (Cullen & Barnes-Holmes, 2008), meat-eating (Barnes-Holmes et al., 
2010a) and sexual offending (Dawson et al., 2009). A small amount of evidence 
currently exists supporting the IRAP‟s validity as a tool for measuring clinically relevant 
variables (Vahey et al., 2009). In this study, participants completed two „practice‟ blocks 
and six „test‟ blocks of the IRAP task; each containing 24 trials. The setup of screen 
presentations during both practice and test blocks can be viewed in Figure 4.1 overleaf. 




were required to respond during „consistent‟ blocks in a way that confirmed self-
perfectionist and other-accepting tendencies and denied self-accepting and other-
perfectionist tendencies. Consistent blocks alternated with „inconsistent‟ blocks in which 
the perspective changed and required responding was reversed (self-accepting and other-
perfectionist tendencies confirmed and self-perfectionist and other-accepting tendencies 
denied). Thus, during each block participants were required to respond in a way that was 
either generally perfectionistic towards themselves and accepting towards others; or 
generally accepting towards themselves and perfectionistic towards others (see 
Appendix H for participant instructions). 
 















FIGURE 4.1: Examples of the Four Trial Types Used in the IRAP (Details in red did not  
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The order of sample (to self/to others) and target (perfectionist/accepting etc.) stimulus 
presentations was randomised across trials with the limitation that each target word 
appeared twice, once in the presence of „to self‟ and once with „to others‟. In this study 
the position of „yes‟ and „no‟ response keys was fixed as displayed in Figure 4.1. This 
decision was made as during piloting of the IRAP task it became too complicated for 
participants when response keys also shifted position between trials. Campbell and 
colleagues (in press) investigated screen presentations in the IRAP and discovered that 
holding response options static actually increased the IRAP effect, although non-
significantly. They concluded that randomising the order of sample and target stimuli 
presented was the critical factor; therefore it was decided response-key positions would 
be fixed in the current study. 
 
4.5. Procedure 
The initial stage of the research procedure involved determining the words that were 
used in the IRAP task and this was completed via an online survey. A list of words with 
similar meanings (synonyms) to „perfectionist‟ and „accepting‟ was generated by 
viewing online dictionaries and thesauruses. A total of 12 synonyms each for 
„perfectionist‟ and „accepting‟ were identified and these were listed in two separate 
questions of an online survey (see Appendix F). For each question, respondents were 
asked to rank the words in order from 1 to 12 according to how closely they resembled 
their understanding of the target word. The survey was sent to the researcher‟s email 
contacts list and was then cascaded via these individuals‟ contact lists. Sixty-five 




which were then used in the IRAP task, alongside the target words. These words can be 
seen in Table 4.1 below. 
 
TABLE 4.1: Top Five „Perfectionist‟ and „Accepting‟ Synonyms as Ranked During a Survey 
Rank „Perfectionist‟ „Accepting‟ 
1 Meticulous Tolerant 
2 Exacting Forgiving 
3 Demanding Compassionate 
4 Idealistic Patient 
5 Pedantic Respectful 
 
 
During the second stage of the research, participants arrived at their allocated research 
time and were again given the opportunity to read the participant information sheet and 
sign the consent form. They then completed a sheet asking several brief demographic 
questions (see Appendix G), alongside the four questionnaires outlined above and the 
IRAP computer task. Prior to completing the IRAP, participants were presented with a 
screen of instructions outlining the task (see Appendix H) and were prompted to think 
generally about „others‟ and not focus their thoughts on any one person. Participants 
completed the two practice blocks as many times as necessary until they achieved the 
required 80% accuracy and 2000ms response speed to move on to the test blocks. They 
were given four attempts to reach these criteria (eight practice blocks in total) and if 





The order of both questionnaire completion and IRAP presentation (consistent-first vs. 
inconsistent-first) was counterbalanced across participants to overcome any potential 
effects of presentation bias on the research findings. The eight different 
counterbalancing orders can be seen in further detail in Appendix I. Following 
completion of the implicit and explicit measures, participants were debriefed thoroughly, 













„However beautiful the strategy, you should  





5.1. Data Transformation and Exploratory Analyses 
Of the initial 99 participants, five were unable to achieve the required accuracy and 
response latency on the IRAP to advance past the practice blocks (see Figure 5.1). Of 
those who did, 37 failed to maintain at least 75% accuracy during test-block trials and 
consequently their implicit data was discarded. However, questionnaire responses from 
these individuals were still included in explicit analyses; thus 99 sets of participant data 
made up the „complete‟ dataset. In addition, 57 sets of participant data (the „75% 
accuracy‟ dataset) were used to examine implicit results and to compare implicit and 
explicit data. This dataset included 33 females and 24 males and the mean age was 25.40 







FIGURE 5.1: Flowchart Detailing the „Complete‟ and „75% Accuracy‟ Datasets 
Enrolled 
N = 99 
Completed 
IRAP Task  
N = 94 
Maintained 
75% Accuracy  
N = 57 
Completed 
Questionnaires  
N = 99 
Randomised 
to Orders 1-8 
Excluded 
N = 5 
Excluded 




Response latencies from the implicit task were transformed into „D-IRAP‟ scores by the 
IRAP programme, using the method outlined in Table 5.1. The four trial types in this 
study were self-perfectionist (P-Self), other-perfectionist (P-Other), self-accepting (A-
Self) and other-accepting (A-Other). Converting raw data into D-IRAP scores allowed 
individual factors to be controlled, such as age and cognitive ability, which otherwise 
might have affected response latencies (Greenwald et al., 2003). 
 
TABLE 5.1: Steps Involved in Calculating D-IRAP Scores (from Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010) 
To Calculate D-IRAP Scores: 
1.  Only response latency data from test blocks are used. 
2.  Latencies above 10,000 ms are eliminated from the data set. 
3.  All data for participants are removed if they produce response latencies less than 300ms on 
more than 10% of test block trials. 
4.  12 standard deviations for the four trial types are computed: four for the response latencies 
from test blocks 1 and 2, four from test blocks 3 and 4, and four from test blocks 5 and 6. 
5.  24 mean latencies for the four trial types in each test block are calculated. 
6.  Difference scores are calculated for each of the four trial types, for each pair of test blocks, by 
subtracting the mean latency of the consistent block from the mean latency of the 
corresponding inconsistent block. 
7.  Each difference score is divided by its corresponding standard deviation from step 4, yielding 
12 D-IRAP scores, one score for each trial type, for each pair of test blocks. 
8.  Four overall trial type D-IRAP scores are calculated by averaging the scores for each trial 
type across the three pairs of test blocks. 
 
 
As the Acceptance of Others Scale (AOS; Fey, 1955) measured responses on a 5-point 
likert scale and the Unconditional Self-Acceptance Questionnaire (USAQ; Chamberlain 




scale (see Appendix J), so the two measures could be compared. Rescaled scores were 
then correlated with original scores, which demonstrated a successful transformation. As 
such, rescaled AOS scores (AOS-R) were used in all subsequent analyses. Descriptive 
statistics including the mean, median, standard deviation and range were calculated for 
each measure and are displayed in Table 5.2. Data was then analysed to determine 
whether assumptions regarding normality were met in order to use parametric tests. 
Normality was initially assessed by looking at histograms and boxplots of total scores 
for all measures; and examining differences between mean and median scores. 
 
TABLE 5.2: Descriptive Statistics for All Measures (Total Scores) 
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32 – 86 











54.5 – 126.5 











3 – 24 
4 – 23 
P-Self 75% Acc. 57 .193 .197 .387 -.523 – .838  
P-Other 75% Acc. 57 -.034 -.087 .351 -.656 – .688 
A-Self 75% Acc. 57 -.024 -.065 .354 -1.18 – .601 
A-Other 75% Acc. 57 .027 .052 .312 -.724 – .612 
 
 
Note. MPS-Self = Self-Oriented Perfectionism [Explicit]; MPS-Other = Other-Oriented Perfectionism [Explicit]; 
USAQ = Unconditional Self-Acceptance Questionnaire [Explicit]; AOS-R = Acceptance of Others Scale - Rescaled 
[Explicit]; GHQ = General Health Questionnaire; P-Self = Self-Perfectionism [Implicit]; P-Other = Other-




Secondly, skewness and kurtosis of distribution for each dependent variable were 
converted into Z-scores (Field, 2009, p.139) and analysed further. The „75% accuracy‟ 
dataset was observed to be normally distributed for both implicit and explicit measures 
(Z < 1.96); however the „complete‟ dataset for explicit measures showed significantly 
skewed distribution for the USAQ (Z = -3.05) and the GHQ (Z = 2.7). As such, 
Kolmogrov-Smirnov‟s goodness-of-fit test was used to explore normality further. This 
test confirmed significantly skewed distribution for the USAQ (D(99) = .11, p = .009) 
and GHQ (D(99) = .12, p = .001), violating the assumption of normality. Furthermore 
AOS-R was highlighted as significantly non-normally distributed according to this test 
(D(99) = .096, p = .026).  
 
As the USAQ and AOS-R were analysed in a paired samples t-test, the difference 
between these measures was subsequently examined for normality (Weaver, 2011). This 
difference score was found to be normally distributed (see Appendix K) and as such, 
data transformation was not necessary during paired samples t-test analysis. For all other 
analyses, square root transformations were applied to the USAQ (USAQ-T), GHQ 
(GHQ-T) and AOS-R (AOS-R-T). These were successful at dealing with the deviations 
from normality for these variables. In addition, homogeneity of variance and sphericity 
were assessed where applicable using Levene‟s test and Mauchly‟s test respectively. 
These tests revealed non-significant results and as such, parametric statistical analyses 





Individuals came forward to participate from a range of schools within the University of 
Edinburgh and the course in which they were enrolled was recorded. Figure 5.2 outlines 
the spread of participants across courses. The „other‟ category contained a range of 
subjects including; computer science, ancient history, economics, politics, international 
relations, business studies, artificial intelligence, geography and informatics. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.2: University Course Studied by Participants 
 
The influence of course studied and all other independent variables on outcome data was 
then explored. Linear regression was used to examine age; an independent-samples t-test 
for participant sex; and one-way ANOVA‟s for order of research completion and course 
studied. The interaction of these factors with all dependent variables was explored for 
both the „complete‟ and „75% accuracy‟ datasets. Results for the „complete‟ dataset 
Results 
¹ The effect size w is defined as the square root of X² divided by N (Cohen, 1988). 





indicated a linear relationship existed between AOS-R-T and age, with 4% of the 
variance in AOS-R-T scores being accounted for by age (t(97) = 2.29, F(1, 97) = 5.26,   
p = .024, f² = .054). Furthermore, AOS-R-T scores were significantly different when 
participant sex was the predictor variable (t(97) = 3.04, p = .003, d = .61), with mean 
female scores (M = 9.7, SD = .75) being higher than mean male scores (M = 9.2,          
SD = .84). Course studied significantly influenced USAQ-T (F(5, 93) = 2.6, p = .03) and 
AOS-R-T (F(5, 93) = 9.3, p < .001) scores. However, it was believed the unequal 
sample sizes, alongside the uneven male-female split across subjects, may account for 
the significant differences observed. Post-hoc analyses, taking unequal sample sizes into 
account, revealed no significant differences in USAQ-T scores across subject areas       
(p > .05). However, significant differences in AOS-R-T scores were observed between 
clinical psychology and all other subject areas, with mean differences on Hochberg‟s 
GT2 test ranging from .78 to 1.38 (p < .05). Therefore, participants enrolled in the 
clinical psychology course reported significantly higher acceptance of others than 
participants in other subject areas.  
 
Crosstabs were used to further examine the interaction between participant sex and 
course studied, results of which can be seen in Figure 5.3. As the „expected‟ count was 
less than five in three cells, philosophy and psychology scores were collapsed into one 
variable and Pearson‟s chi-square test was performed. The value of the chi-square 
statistic was highly significant (X²(4) = 43.87, p < .001, w = .67¹), indicating that 




whether the impact of course on AOS-R-T scores was primarily a result of discrepancies 
between participant sex and so both were controlled for in subsequent analyses. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.3: The Male-Female Split Across Course Studied 
 
The impact of course studied on participant age was also explored, as despite the study 
including postgraduate students from all subject areas, clinical psychology was the only 
purely postgraduate sample (see Appendix L). The impact of age on AOS-R-T scores 
was therefore investigated using partial correlations, controlling for the effect of course 
studied. It became clear the two variables were no longer significantly correlated when 
the impact of course studied was removed (r = .104, p = .31) and as such, age was not 




In the „75% accuracy‟ dataset a linear relationship was observed between GHQ-T and 
age, with 5% of the variance in GHQ-T scores being accounted for by age (t(56) = 2.03, 
F(1, 55) = 4.12, p = .047, f² = .075). However once again, partial correlations controlling 
for the impact of course studied meant the interaction of age alone became non-
significant (r = .257, p = .056). In addition, a significant difference in AOS-R scores was 
observed between individuals studying different courses (F(5, 51) = 3.93, p = .004); 
however small sample sizes across groups in this test means the finding should be 
interpreted with caution. 
 
Order of research completion demonstrated no significant effect on dependent variables 
with one-way ANOVA‟s and as such, the variable was collapsed into two new 
categories for analysis with an independent samples t-test. These categories were 
implicit-first (IRAP) and explicit-first (questionnaires); however once again no 
significant differences were observed for either the „complete‟ or „75% accuracy‟ 
datasets. Order of research completion therefore had a non-significant impact on 
outcome data. In summary, participant sex and course studied were the only variables 
demonstrating main effects on AOS-R-T scores and as such, were controlled for in all 
analyses involving this variable. No other variables were controlled for. 
 
5.2. Hypotheses Testing 
Hypothesis 1: Scores will be higher for self-oriented perfectionism than for other-





Dependent samples t-tests were used to examine this hypothesis and for the explicit 
measures, mean MPS-Self scores (M = 65.4, SE = 1.75) were observed to be 
significantly higher than mean MPS-Other scores (M = 52.1, SE = 1.3); demonstrating 
that on average participants were significantly more perfectionistic towards themselves 
than towards others (t(98) = 9.4, p < .001, d = .88). Scores on the IRAP task generated 
similar findings (t(56) = 3.2, p = .002, d = .61); participants responded significantly 
more quickly when they had to confirm perfectionistic beliefs for themselves (P-Self;   
M = .193, SE = .051), than when they had to confirm perfectionistic beliefs for others  
(P-Other; M = -.034, SE = .046). Thus, Hypothesis 1 was supported for both explicit and 
implicit measures. 
 
In addition, MPS-Self and MPS-Other scores demonstrated significant association with 
each other (r = .599, p < .001), meaning that if an individual was highly self-
perfectionistic they were also more likely to be more perfectionistic towards others. 
However the IRAP task did not reflect these results, as P-Self was not significantly 
associated with P-Other (r = -.048, p = .73). 
 
Hypothesis 2: Scores will be higher for acceptance of others than for self-acceptance on 
both explicit and implicit measures. 
This hypothesis was also examined with dependent samples t-tests and for the explicit 
measures, mean AOS-R scores (M = 90.8, SE = 1.57) were observed to be significantly 
higher than mean USAQ scores (M = 67.9, SE = 1.03); demonstrating that on average 




(t(98) = 15.2, p < .001, d = 1.77). A repeated measures ANCOVA was then run to 
determine the impact of course studied and participant sex on the variance between 
acceptance scores. There was a significant main effect for USAQ versus AOS-R scores, 
again suggesting that people were more accepting of others than they were of themselves 
(F(1, 96) = 138.63, p < .001, r = .59). Furthermore, course studied was found to have a 
significant impact on the variance between AOS-R and USAQ scores (F(1, 96) = 13.4,   
p < .001, r = .12); suggesting that the effect was stronger for some courses than others. 
This interaction can be seen in Figure 5.4 below. No interaction effect was observed for 
participant sex (F(1, 96) = .22, p = .641, r = .002). 
 
 




Scores on the IRAP task generated somewhat different findings; a non-significant 
difference was observed between participant response times when confirming self-
accepting and when confirming other-accepting beliefs (t(56) = .89, p = .38, d = .16). 
The effect size according to Cohen’s d further suggests that very little difference existed 
between these variables and as such; on implicit measures participants were equally as 
accepting of others as they were of themselves. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was only partially 
supported.  
 
Associations between these variables were also examined using Pearson’s correlations. 
Partial correlations controlling for the effects of participant sex and course studied 
demonstrated that USAQ-T and AOS-R-T scores were significantly associated with each 
other (r = .324, p = .001), meaning that if an individual was highly accepting of others 
they were also more likely to be accepting of themselves. Once again the IRAP task did 
not reflect these results, as bivariate correlations revealed that A-Other was not 
significantly associated with A-Self (r = .147, p = .27). 
 
Hypothesis 3: Self-oriented perfectionism will be negatively correlated with self-
acceptance on explicit measures.  
Pearson‟s correlations were performed (see Table 5.3) and MPS-Self was found to be 
significantly negatively associated with USAQ-T (r = -.455, p < .001). This suggested 
individuals who were highly self-perfectionistic were more likely to also be low in self-






TABLE 5.3: Correlations for Explicit Measures (with controls where relevant) 
 
Note. ** p < .01 (2-tailed), * p < .05 (2-tailed). MPS-Self = Self-Oriented Perfectionism; MPS-
Other = Other-Oriented Perfectionism; USAQ-T = Unconditional Self-Acceptance Questionnaire 
[Transformed]; AOS-R-T = Acceptance of Others Scale - Rescaled [Transformed]; and GHQ = 
General Health Questionnaire [Transformed]. 
 
 
Hypothesis 4: Perfectionism for others will be negatively correlated with acceptance of 
others on explicit measures.   
The association between MPS-Other and AOS-R-T was examined using partial 
correlations, controlling for the effects of participant sex and course studied. MPS-Other 
was found to be significantly negatively associated with AOS-R-T (r = -.35, p < .001), 
providing support for Hypothesis 4. Thus, individuals who were highly perfectionistic 
towards others were more likely to also be less accepting of others. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Implicit scores for self-oriented perfectionism, other-oriented 
perfectionism, self-acceptance and acceptance of others will not be associated with 
explicit scores. 
Pearson‟s correlations were performed for the „75% accuracy‟ dataset (see Table 5.4). 
These demonstrated non-significant associations between implicit and explicit measures 
 MPS-Self MPS-Other USAQ-T AOS-R-T GHQ-T 
MPS-Self .     
MPS-Other .599** .    
USAQ-T -.455** -.382** .   
AOS-R-T -.338** -.350** .324** .  




for self-oriented perfectionism (r = -.033, p = .81), other-oriented perfectionism             
(r = -.020, p = .88), self-acceptance (r = .077, p = .571) and acceptance of others           
(r = -.032, p = .81). Thus Hypothesis 5 was supported. 
 
TABLE 5.4: Correlations for the 75% Accuracy Dataset 
Note. ** p < .01 (2-tailed), * p < .05 (2-tailed). MPS-Self = Self-Oriented Perfectionism [Explicit]; MPS-Other = 
Other-Oriented Perfectionism [Explicit]; USAQ = Unconditional Self-Acceptance Questionnaire [Explicit]; AOS-R = 
Acceptance of Others Scale - Rescaled [Explicit]; GHQ = General Health Questionnaire; P-Self = Self-Perfectionism 




5.3. Secondary Aims 
Aim 1: Relationships between perfectionism and acceptance for self and others on 
implicit measures will be explored. 
D-IRAP scores were examined and plotted as seen in Figure 5.5 overleaf. This outlined 
the speed with which participants responded to individual trials. A positive D-IRAP 
score indicated that participants pressed the „yes‟ key more quickly than the „no‟ key 
when asked to confirm or deny perfectionistic or accepting tendencies. A negative       
 MPS-Self MPS-Other USAQ AOS-R GHQ P-Self P-Other A-Self A-Other 
MPS-Self .         
MPS-Other .667** .        
USAQ -.498** -.490** .       
AOS-R -.380** -.413** .322* .      
GHQ .271* .382** -.481** -.292* .     
P-Self -.033 -.075 .051 -.068 -.036 .    
P-Other -.050 -.020 .132 -.024 -.064 -.048 .   
A-Self .083 .010 .077 -.031 -.059 .456** .274* .  




D-IRAP score indicated that participants pressed the „no‟ key more quickly than the 
„yes‟ key when confirming or denying beliefs. One-sample t-tests were then run to 
investigate the extent to which D-IRAP scores differed significantly from zero. As seen 
in Figure 5.5, confirming self-perfectionistic tendencies produced the significantly 
fastest response times (t(56) = 3.75, p < .001, d = .50), followed by denying other-
perfectionistic tendencies; although this score was not significantly different from zero 
(t(56) = -.734, p = .47, d = .10). Furthermore, individuals displayed a slight preference 
for denying self-accepting tendencies more quickly than they were confirmed          
(t(56) = -.516, p = .61, d = .07) and confirming acceptance of other tendenices, more 
quickly than they were denied (t(56) = .662, p = .51, d = .09); although these findings 
were not statistically significant.  
 
 







In examining associations between the implicit results (see Table 5.4), P-Self response 
times were significantly positively correlated with A-Self response times (r = .456,        
p < .001); contrasting with the significant negative relation observed for explicit 
measures. In addition, P-Other was significantly positively correlated with A-Self 
response times (r = .274, p = .039). No other significant relations were observed. 
 
Aim 2: Relationships between perfectionism, acceptance and general health will be 
explored for both explicit and implicit measures.  
The „75% accuracy‟ dataset demonstrated no significant correlations between GHQ and 
P-Self, P-Other, A-Self or A-Other. As such, the „complete‟ dataset was used to 
determine the interaction of GHQ-T with explicit measures. As outlined in Table 5.3, 
significant associations between GHQ-T and all explicit measures were observed; 
therefore further statistical analyses were run to explore these interactions in greater 
detail. MPS-Self was significantly positively correlated with GHQ-T; and linear 
regression analysis demonstrated that 4% of the variance in GHQ-T scores was 
accounted for by MPS-Self (t(97) = 6.28, F(1, 97) = 4.7, p = .033, f² = .048). MPS-Other 
and GHQ-T were also significantly positively correlated, with MPS-Other accounting 
for 9% of the variance in GHQ-T scores (t(97) = 6.08, F(1, 97) = 10.57, p = .002,          
f² = .109). In examining the interaction between these dimensions further, partial 
correlations were run controlling for the impact of MPS-Self and MPS-Other on GHQ-T 
scores. The significant association between MPS-Other and GHQ-T remained when 
MPS-Self was the covariate (r = .236, p = .019). However, the association between 




p = .727). This indicated that MPS-Other was the better predictor of psychological 
distress. 
 
Furthermore, the significant negative correlation between USAQ-T and GHQ-T was 
explored and USAQ-T was shown to account for 21% of the variance in GHQ-T scores 
(t(97) = 11.81, F(1, 97) = 27.73, p < .001, f² = .285). Finally, AOS-R-T was observed to 
be significantly negatively correlated with GHQ-T; and multiple regression analysis, 
controlling for the effects of participant sex and course studied (dummy coded), 
demonstrated that AOS-R-T accounted for 5% of the variance in GHQ-T scores             
(t(97) = -2.44, F(1, 97) = 5.97, p = .016, f² = .062). Course studied and participant sex 
were found to have no significant effect on GHQ scores as main effects. As such, low 
self-acceptance scores were the biggest predictor of high GHQ-T scores, which signified 










„There is no ending that  






The overall aim of this study was to assess the interaction of perfectionism and 
acceptance for self and towards other people, using both explicit and implicit measures. 
This was carried out by exploring several hypotheses that will now be examined in turn 




It was hypothesised that participant scores would be higher for self-oriented 
perfectionism than other-oriented perfectionism, in line with existing research (e.g. 
Chang, 2006; Flett et al., 2003; Scott, 2007). For explicit measures, this hypothesis was 
supported and significant differences between MPS-Self and MPS-Other scores were 
observed, with „self‟ scores significantly higher than „other‟ scores. Thus, participants 
reported higher levels of perfectionistic striving and increased setting of excessively 
high achievement goals, for the self as opposed to for others. In addition, MPS-Self 
scores were significantly positively correlated with MPS-Other scores; indicating that 




levels of perfectionism for others. This fits the theory that „self‟ is the reference point 
from which perceptions and attitudes towards others originate (Sullivan, 1947). 
Therefore if an individual‟s relation with themselves is largely critical and 
perfectionistic, this appears to promote perfectionistic evaluations of other people. 
 
On the IRAP task, significant differences between „self‟ and „other‟ scores were also 
observed, with scores for self-perfectionism significantly higher than perfectionism for 
others. This was reflected by participants confirming self-perfectionistic tendencies 
significantly more quickly than they were denied; and denying other-perfectionistic 
tendencies more quickly than they were confirmed. In terms of association between 
implicit P-Self and P-Other scores, the two dimensions were observed to be non-
significantly correlated. For these measures to reflect the association observed between 
explicit „self‟ and „other‟ scores, a significant negative relationship in terms of D-IRAP 
scores would be expected. The lack of a significant association suggests that implicit 
„self‟ and „other‟ perfectionism scores were not generally related. As such, an individual 
high in perfectionism for the self might also be high in perfectionism for others, but 
equally they might be low in perfectionism for others. These findings will be explored in 
terms of relational frame theory in Section 6.5. 
 
Furthermore, it was hypothesised that explicit scores for self-perfectionism and other-
perfectionism would not be associated with their implicit counterparts. This hypothesis 
was supported, as participant scores on explicit measures were not significantly related 




scores were compared, no association was discovered. This appears to reflect that what 
individuals report they believe and what the IRAP task suggests they believe are 
unrelated; potentially fitting with theories outlined in Chapter 3 regarding „immediate‟ 
and „elaborated‟ relational responding (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010). Again, this will be 
explored further below. 
 
In summary, self-perfectionism scores were higher than other-perfectionism scores on 
both explicit and implicit measures. Significant differences between these scores were 
observed for both explicit and implicit measures; however only explicit measures 
demonstrated significant associations between the two dimensions. Implicit self-
perfectionism and other-perfectionism were not significantly related. Finally, explicit 
self-perfectionism and other-perfectionism scores were not related to their equivalent 
implicit scores.  
 
6.3. Acceptance 
Preliminary exploratory analyses highlighted two potential confounding variables in 
terms of explicit acceptance of others scores. These were participant sex and course 
studied. A significant difference was observed between AOS-R-T scores and participant 
sex, with females reporting significantly higher acceptance of others than males. In 
addition, when uneven sample sizes were taken into account, individuals studying 
clinical psychology were found to be significantly more accepting of others than all 
other participants. As such, these two factors were controlled for in all analyses 




covariates were observed to impact on implicit acceptance of others scores. Whilst this 
might be due to the reduced sample size within this group; it may also be explained by a 
tendency for participants who are female or studying clinical psychology to report 
higher acceptance of others than implicit measures suggest actually exist. Possible 
explanations for this will be explored in Section 6.5.  
 
In terms of acceptance for self and others, it was hypothesised that scores would be 
higher for acceptance of others than for self-acceptance; in line with existing research 
(e.g. Berger, 1952; Fey, 1954; Suinn, 1961). For explicit measures this hypothesis was 
supported and significant differences between „self‟ and „other‟ acceptance scores were 
observed, with AOS-R scores significantly higher than USAQ scores. Furthermore, 
AOS-R-T scores were significantly positively correlated with USQAQ-T scores; 
indicating that participants high in other-acceptance were also more likely to report 
higher levels of self-acceptance. This would again fit with the theory of „self‟ as the 
reference point from which perceptions and attitudes towards others originate (Sullivan, 
1947); thus the two dimensions are significantly associated.  
 
However, on the IRAP computer task no significant differences were observed between 
participant response times for self-accepting and other-accepting beliefs. A small 
tendency for individuals to deny self-acceptance more quickly than it was confirmed and 
confirm acceptance of others more quickly than it was denied was observed; however 
these tendencies were not statistically significant. The contrast between implicit and 




terms of „self‟ and „other‟ and what the IRAP task records as their beliefs, are somewhat 
dissimilar. This would fit with theories regarding „immediate‟ and „elaborated‟ relational 
responding (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010). Along with the lack of significant differences 
between A-Self and A-Other scores, the two were also observed as not significantly 
associated with each other. This means that participants with increased acceptance of 
others might equally be low or high in self-acceptance. This suggests that an individual‟s 
self-accepting network of verbal relations is not strongly related to their verbal network 
involving acceptance of others, which again is outlined further below. 
 
Finally, it was hypothesised that explicit and implicit scores for self-acceptance and 
other-acceptance would not be associated. This hypothesis was supported as participant 
scores on explicit measures were not significantly related to their equivalent scores on 
implicit measures. For example, when USAQ-T and A-Self were compared, no 
associations were found. Again, this reflects the lack of an association between what 
individuals report they believe and what the IRAP task records, which could be down to 
participants altering their beliefs in order to appear more accepting. This is explored 
further in Section 6.5. 
 
In summary, other-acceptance scores were significantly higher than self-acceptance 
scores on explicit measures. For implicit measures the difference between self and other 
scores was not significant. In addition, only explicit measures demonstrated significant 




scores were not significantly related. Finally, explicit self-acceptance and other-
acceptance scores were not related to their equivalent implicit scores. 
 
6.4. Perfectionism and Acceptance 
A number of hypotheses explored the interaction between perfectionism and acceptance 
for the self and other in further detail. Firstly, it was hypothesised that self-oriented 
perfectionism would be negatively correlated with self-acceptance on explicit measures. 
This hypothesis was supported, as MPS-Self was found to be significantly negatively 
associated with USAQ-T; suggesting that participants who were highly self-
perfectionistic were more likely to also be low in self-acceptance and vice-versa. This 
provides further evidence to support the theory that dimensions of perfectionism are 
generally associated with lower levels of self-acceptance (Ellis, 2002; Flett et al., 2002). 
The origin of this association is difficult to ascertain, however as Scott (2007) proposed, 
both a developmental and an operational approach are possible at different stages in the 
lifecycle. In the former, perfectionism would be adopted as a means to overcome low 
self-acceptance; and in the latter, striving behaviours and maladaptive self-evaluations 
would lower self-acceptance, given that perfection is rarely attainable. 
 
Secondly, it was hypothesised that perfectionism for others would be negatively 
associated with acceptance of others on explicit measures. This hypothesis was also 
supported, as MPS-Other was found to be significantly negatively associated with AOS-
R-T. Thus, individuals who were highly perfectionistic towards others were more likely 




develop alongside self-perfectionistic and self-accepting tendencies given the 
observations made above. For example, an operational origin might propose that an 
individual first relates the high standards they have for themselves to others, finds that 
others are unable to meet them and therefore becomes less accepting of other people. A 
developmental origin might involve an individual setting high standards for other people 
as an attempt to overcome their low acceptance of others, which is based on 
developmental experiences and is related to their own low self-acceptance. The idea that 
an individual either internalises or externalises their perfectionistic tendencies (Flett & 
Hewitt, 2002) was not supported, as the significant association between relating high 
standards to the „self‟ and to „others‟ suggests that both internalisation and 
externalisation occurs.  
 
In terms of implicit perfectionism and acceptance scores, a significant positive 
association was observed between P-Self response times and A-Self response times; 
contrasting with the significant negative relation observed for explicit measures. This 
will be explained in the context of relational frame theory in the section below and 
suggests a significant relation between „self‟ framing for both perfectionism and 
acceptance; thus reaction times were associated. In addition, P-Other was significantly 
positively correlated with A-Self; however P-Other and A-Other demonstrated no 
significant interaction. This suggests that where no preference between confirming or 
denying perfectionistic and accepting relations was observed, reaction times were 




significant preference was also observed, means this result could be something of a 
chance finding. 
 
6.5. Findings in the Context of Relational Frame Theory 
Several findings have been outlined thus far that would benefit from further explanation 
in terms of relational frame theory (RFT; Hayes et al., 2001). This section will now 
review these findings and provide a potential understanding of the results observed in 
this research. The first observation relates to „self‟ and „other‟ perfectionism scores, 
which were found to be significantly different and were also non-significantly 
associated; contrasting with explicit findings. This was reflected by participants 
confirming self-perfectionistic tendencies significantly more quickly than they were 
denied; denying other-perfectionistic tendencies more quickly than they were confirmed; 
and these two response times being non-significantly related to each other. An RFT 
explanation for this difference in scores and the lack of significant association is 
provided by thinking about „framing‟ relating perfectionistic words to both „self‟ and 
„other‟ (Blackledge, 2003).  
 
The increased speed with which „self‟ and perfectionistic words (e.g. exacting, 
demanding, etc.) were confirmed indicates more established relational framing linked 
these elements than „other‟ and perfectionistic words, as it took participants longer to 
confirm this latter relation. Exploring this further; when required to press the „no‟ 
response key to „self‟ and perfectionistic words, participants responded more slowly, as 




between the elements presented (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006). Again, thinking about the 
response strength of different elements via relational framing; the relation between 
„other‟ and perfectionistic words was denied more rapidly than it was confirmed, as for 
the average participant, a network linking these elements was less well established. 
Thus, it took longer to press the „yes‟ key to confirm this relation, as it was less well 
reinforced by previous learning experiences. In addition, aspects of equivalence 
(Blackledge, 2003) on this network allowed „perfectionist‟ to be associated with words 
such as „exacting‟, „demanding‟, „idealistic‟ and „pedantic‟. This was likely due to 
individuals‟ prior experience in relating these words during their learning of the English 
language; and their use of these words in contexts (Blackledge, 2003). Thus, the 
response strength between these elements of relational networking was greater than the 
incongruent elements of relating. 
 
Furthermore, the lack of association observed between implicit measures of „self‟ and 
„other‟ perfectionism suggests that an individual‟s network of verbal relations for self-
perfection is not strongly related to their verbal network involving perfection for others. 
In this manner, the properties defining „self‟ and the average „other‟, or their qualities 
and functions in relation to perfectionism, are regarded as non-equivalent (Blackledge, 
2003). Thus the different „frames‟ of elements activated are non-significantly related. 
This contrasts with explicit findings where a significant association between self-
oriented and other-oriented perfectionism was observed. Implicit scores for 
perfectionism were not associated with their counterpart explicit scores; providing 




apparently somewhat different. One possible explanation for this disparity would fit with 
theories outlined in Section 3.4 regarding „immediate‟ and „elaborated‟ relational 
responding (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010). This means that when participants were given 
longer to think about their responses, they were more likely to report carefully 
considered and socially acceptable beliefs. The IRAP taps into „immediate‟ relational 
responding, as participants were required to respond within 2000ms of trials appearing 
onscreen. As such, they were unable to monitor their responses and they were based on 
uncensored beliefs regarding the relations presented. Alternative explanations for the 
disparity between explicit and implicit measures will be discussed in Section 6.8. The 
next question concerns reasons as to why participants would alter the levels of self and 
other perfectionism reported explicitly. It is unclear whether beliefs were over or under-
reported on explicit measures; however it appears some consistency was employed in 
the responses given, in order for „self‟ and „other‟ beliefs to be significantly associated. 
As such, the process by which the MPS (Hewitt & Flett, 1991) was completed may have 
impacted on reported scores. It may be that perfectionistic individuals were concerned 
about giving the „right‟ answers and thus did more checking back on their previous 
answers to ensure they were being consistent, before responding to the question asked. 
This might explain the association that was observed between explicit measures of self-
oriented and other-oriented perfectionism, as this scale mixes up both dimensions on the 
one questionnaire (Hewitt & Flett, 1991). In addition, this likely meant that participants 
took longer to think about their answers and thus different elements appeared in their 




interesting to note questionnaire completion times in future research, in order to 
determine whether this theory is supported.   
 
The observed difference between explicit and implicit perfectionism scores may also be 
down to individual self-reflective capacities. As Nisbett and Wilson (1977) noted, 
human introspection is rather fragile; and to a certain extent it depends on an 
understanding of other‟s tendencies in relation to one‟s own, so that „more‟ or „less‟ 
comparisons can be made. Thus when deciding how much they agreed or disagreed with 
a statement, participants may have reflected on their own experiences of others; which 
undoubtedly might be subject to bias depending on the social networks an individual has 
encountered. Thus, a perfectionistic individual who believes that someone they know is 
more perfectionistic may subsequently under-report their own scores given this 
relational comparison. In addition, participants whose self-reflective capacity is rather 
limited may have under or over-reported scores; given a lack of insight regarding their 
actual beliefs. 
 
Finally, whether or not perfectionism is a quality valued by participants, or their peers, 
may have skewed the scores they reported. Given that humans are social beings who 
seek to form connections with others to avoid isolation (Cacioppo & Patrick, 2008), it 
could be that participants under or over-reported beliefs in order to increase their 
acceptability to others. For many individuals, perfectionism for the self can be a positive 
thing as it shows an individual cares about something and will work hard to get things 




bathroom; the „finished‟ product might mean individuals are regarded more highly by 
others for their abilities. Conversely, experiences where an individual receives negative 
feedback for “trying too hard” might mean they attempt to hide their perfectionistic 
tendencies. This is particularly true during the school years when social evaluations and 
acceptance by peers becomes immensely important (Parker & Gottman, 1989). 
Perfectionistic individuals may stand out as high achievers, which could lead to envy 
from their peers. In order to avoid the derogatory labels that accompany being singled 
out (e.g. “swot”), individuals may thus attempt to hide their desire for perfection in order 
to reconnect with others. Furthermore as young adults, free-spiritedness and flexibility 
might be regarded as more desirable than rigidity and competitiveness; thus 
perfectionism may again be hidden. The standards an individual has for the „self‟ may 
also be perceived as the standards they possess for others and so in order to appear more 
amenable to others, perfectionistic tendencies may be covered up. These reasons could 
explain the difference in scores reported by participants and those recorded by the IRAP. 
 
Regarding self-acceptance and the acceptance of others; scores were significantly 
different for explicit measures, with reported acceptance of others significantly higher 
than reported self-acceptance. However for implicit measures, no significant differences 
were observed between response times for A-Self and for A-Other. This suggests that 
participants were equally as accepting of themselves as they were of others. In RFT 
terms, this indicates that a network relating „self‟ and accepting words (e.g. tolerant, 
forgiving, patient, etc.) is not any more established than a network relating „other‟ and 




response keys were pressed at very similar rates. Thus, „yes‟ was not pressed more 
quickly (which would indicate highly reinforced relational responding); and „no‟ was not 
pressed more slowly (which would indicate the „overriding‟ of an established relational 
response) and vice-versa. 
 
In terms of implicit relations, A-Self was not significantly associated with A-Other, 
contrasting with explicit findings. According to RFT, this suggests that the average 
participant‟s network of self-accepting verbal relations is not strongly related to their 
verbal network involving acceptance of others (Hayes et al., 2001). Thus „self‟ and 
„other‟ in relation to accepting words were not highly associated. Furthermore, 
acceptance for self and for others on explicit measures was not significantly related to 
the equivalent score on implicit measures, providing evidence in support of Hypothesis 
5. This again draws attention to the observed difference between what participants 
reported as their beliefs and what the IRAP task recorded; fitting with theories regarding 
„immediate‟ and „elaborated‟ relational responding (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006). 
Possible reasons for this difference will now be explored in relation to acceptance of self 
and others. 
 
One potential explanation for the difference in explicit and implicit findings might be 
that individuals reported more acceptance of others than the IRAP task suggests actually 
exists. This was first noted in relation to the significant difference between the 
interaction of covariates with the explicit and implicit data. Namely, participant sex and 




and female participants, along with those studying clinical psychology, were identified 
as reporting greater levels of acceptance of others. Whilst appearing to be more 
accepting of others has been highlighted as a strategy to overcome low self-acceptance 
(Fey, 1955); females and clinical psychology students in this study did not present with 
lower self-acceptance levels. Thus another explanation must be sought to account for 
differences between implicit and explicit findings. As touched on in Chapter 2, increased 
acceptance of others may be a way of promoting sociability via acceptance by others. 
This aid to sociability could be particularly important for females who are generally 
thought of as more sociable than males; something Baron-Cohen (2003) attributes to the 
female brain predominately being „hard-wired‟ for empathy. As such, appearing more 
accepting of others (whether a conscious or subconscious strategy) may enable females 
to form friendships with others who value their openness and warmth.  
 
Furthermore, an extension of this sociability explanation may be the factor enabling 
clinical psychology students to form successful relationships with their patients. These 
patients are individuals who have frequently experienced significant interpersonal 
adversity and a lack of acceptance by others, given their early developmental 
environments (Flett & Hewitt, 2002). Thus, clinical psychology trainees who appear 
highly accepting of others might be viewed as more understanding, supportive and 
trustworthy by their patients. This in turn means patients may feel more able to share 
their underlying vulnerabilities and „core pain‟, which they might otherwise feel unable 
to do. It is the identification of this pain and the often unhelpful defences employed to 




models. Indeed, Rogers (1951) believed this „unconditional positive regard‟ was 
essential for any therapeutic relationship and without it, personal growth for patients was 
almost impossible. As such, differences between „immediate‟ and „elaborated‟ relational 
responding may exist for clinical psychology students, given their own developmental 
experiences. However, as long as their delayed and considered responding reflects this 
increased acceptance of others; this essentially is the requisite of a therapist. Indeed, 
individuals completing the clinical psychology programme receive explicit training and 
support in developing their ability to accept others and keep an open mind; therefore 
these relational responses are well established. This „sociability‟ and „rapport‟ theory 
may therefore help to explain the elevated levels of acceptance of others reported by 
female participants and those studying clinical psychology. 
 
Potential reasons for under or over-reporting self-acceptance beliefs may again involve 
sociability. Participants who were low in self-acceptance may have over-reported their 
beliefs in order to present themselves as more attractive to others, believing that 
confidence is appealing to others (Robinson et al., 1995). Conversely, individuals may 
have under-reported their beliefs, given that society tends to value modesty and humility 
as opposed to arrogance (Leary, 1996). Therefore participants who were actually high in 
self-acceptance may have consciously or subconsciously chosen to appear less accepting 
as a mechanism to draw people in. 
 
When looking at the implicit relationship between perfectionism and acceptance scores, 




Self response times. As outlined above, this suggests the response strength of relational 
elements when „self‟ is the perspective taken might be similar for both perfectionism and 
acceptance. Thus, it took a similar amount of time for participants to respond to „self‟ 
and „perfectionist‟ relations, as it did to respond to „self‟ and „accepting‟ relations. This 
contrasts with the significant negative correlation observed between explicit self-
perfectionism and self-acceptance scores; and again may be explained by the under or 
over-reporting of beliefs. 
 
6.6. Perfectionism, Acceptance and General Health 
Secondary aims of the research included exploring the interaction between general 
health and perfectionism and acceptance for the self and others. Significant correlations 
were observed between all explicit measures and general health. MPS-Self and MPS-
Other were significantly positively correlated with GHQ-T; suggesting that increases in 
perfectionism for the self or others meant participants‟ general health was likely to 
decrease (higher scores indicate more distress). In terms of these scores predicting 
variation in GHQ-T, other-oriented perfectionism was observed to predict 9% of the 
variation, whereas self-oriented perfectionism predicted only 4%. This finding contrasts 
with the majority of research in which self-oriented and other-oriented perfectionism 
display similar levels of association with psychological distress, with MPS-Self just 
slightly the better predictor (e.g. Flett et al., 2003; Scott, 2007, etc.). Indeed, several 
authors (Hollender, 1965; Hunter & O‟Connor, 2003) suggest other-oriented 
perfectionism is rarely associated with depression, putting this down to a decreased 




between „self‟ and „other‟ explicit measures of perfectionism, with self-oriented 
perfectionism typically higher than other-oriented scores. As such, it may not have been 
the interaction of MPS-Other alone that predicted depression; but that participants 
reporting higher levels of this dimension were also likely to present with even higher 
levels of MPS-Self and this combination may account for the increasingly significant 
association observed. Whereas MPS-Self on its own generally indicated lower levels of 
MPS-Other; levels that were perhaps too low to add to the interaction with GHQ. This 
interaction was subsequently explored and other-oriented perfectionism remained 
significantly positively associated with GHQ-T when self-oriented perfectionism was 
controlled for. However; MPS-Self became non-significantly correlated with GHQ-T 
when MPS-Other was added as a covariate. Thus, the idea that interactions between the 
dimensions of perfectionism led to other-oriented perfectionism being the better 
predictor of psychological distress, was not supported. As such, it appears that 
individuals in this study presenting with higher levels of self-oriented perfectionism did 
not regard it as a negative attribute and instead considered it an adaptive trait.  Other-
oriented perfectionism was the greater predictor of psychological distress and this 
finding was perhaps due to the increased impact of this dimension on social relations 
(Flett & Hewitt, 2002). 
 
Lower levels of self-acceptance were found to be the biggest predictor of psychological 
distress, accounting for 21% of the variation in GHQ-T scores. In addition, acceptance 
of others was significantly negatively associated with GHQ-T; accounting for 5% of the 




Thus, acceptance for the self had a much larger impact on general health than 
perfectionism for the self. Again, this fits with existing research highlighting the 
importance of self-acceptance in the field of mental health and psychological distress 
(e.g. Dobson et al., 2008; Chamberlain & Haaga, 2001; Wilson, 1996). Self-acceptance 
was not examined as a mediator of psychological distress in this study, however findings 
indicate that increasing self-acceptance is likely to significantly reduce levels of distress.  
 
For the IRAP task, no significant associations were observed between GHQ-T and 
implicit measures of perfectionism and acceptance. This fits with findings thus far 
highlighting a lack of association between all explicit measures and scores on the IRAP 
task. This is potentially explained by the idea that the „framing‟ an individual carries, 
based on their previous learning experiences, has no direct influence on their current 
behaviour and subsequent thoughts and feelings. The important factor might be the 
extent to which an individual translates this framing into behaviour and what impact this 
then has on their lives. Although if this were the case, it might be expected that some 
correlation would be observed between the „framing‟ (measured by the implicit task) 
and the resulting behaviours (captured by explicit measures). Perhaps the degree to 
which different individuals allow automatic responding to influence their lives varies 
hugely and as such, no association is apparent. For some participants a general lack of 
insight might mean their ability to self-monitor feelings and emotions, as captured by the 
GHQ, is affected. Thus, they might be high in self-oriented perfectionism, report low 
levels of the construct and additionally report low levels of distress. The next individual 




low levels of distress. Finally, a third individual might be low in self-oriented 
perfectionism, report high levels of the construct and high levels of distress. Thus, the 
relation between explicit reporting and GHQ is consistent; however the relation between 
implicit measures and GHQ is somewhat unpredictable.  
 
In the above example, the latter individual‟s explicit responding might be influenced by 
their higher level of psychological distress. Thus, participants whose current 
psychological health was poor might have been more likely to rate themselves „harshly‟ 
by over-reporting perfectionism scores, if they regarded this as a negative quality. This 
could be particularly true for reported levels of other-oriented perfectionism, which 
demonstrated greater association with depression than self-oriented perfectionism. As 
such, individuals high in psychological distress may have over-reported how harsh they 
were on others, given the distorting influence of distress on their thoughts and beliefs 
(Frijda et al., 2000). Conversely other individuals may have behaved differently, which 
potentially accounts for the lack of an association observed between all implicit 
measures and GHQ-T scores. 
 
6.7. Clinical Implications 
The findings observed in this research have potentially important implications in the 
field of mental health. For many years, therapeutic techniques centred around attempting 
to reduce individuals‟ perfectionistic standards and beliefs in order to overcome 
psychological distress. This „change‟ strategy frequently resulted in poor outcomes, as it 




due to it being the only means by which they felt acceptable (Frost et al., 1995). 
However, in recent decades the idea that self-acceptance can act as a mediator between 
perfectionism and distress relations has subtly changed the focus of therapy (Gilbert, 
2010; Hayes et al., 1999). Thus, promoting self-acceptance is now believed to be the key 
to overcoming psychological distress; and the therapeutic relationship is frequently 
considered the means by which an individual can learn to be self-accepting, given the 
model of acceptance by others they receive. This change in focus was supported by 
explicit findings in the current research, as low levels of self-acceptance were identified 
as the biggest predictor of psychological distress. This new slant is also thought to be 
more acceptable to patients, as it involves adding something new to their repertoire 
rather than attempting to change what already exists. This is particularly important for 
perfectionists who might view the need for „change‟ as an indication that they are 
imperfect to begin with (Flett & Hewitt, 2002). Thus, increasing self-acceptance may in 
turn reduce perfectionistic striving as patients no longer rely so completely on this for 
feelings of self-worth. 
 
The lack of association between explicit and implicit levels of perfectionism and 
acceptance in this study also highlights the disparity that could exist between reported 
beliefs and „underlying‟ beliefs in the therapeutic setting. Whether explicit beliefs are 
under or over-reported is not clear; however this could affect the approach taken during 
therapy. In cases where distress is experienced due to the under-reporting of self-
perfectionistic or over-reporting of self-accepting tendencies; the task might be to help 




2002), in order to develop an integrated sense of self. These techniques may also 
improve empathy and allow interpersonal relating to improve. In addition, the over-
reporting of acceptance of others may cause difficulties for individuals if they constantly 
subjugate their own needs in order to accept and meet the needs of others (Young et al., 
2003). Thus, the task of therapy might be to limit other-accepting and „pleasing‟ 
tendencies in order for individuals to meet their own needs, whilst promoting acceptance 
of this new „self‟ relational framing. 
 
In terms of forming a therapeutic relationship; as touched on above, individuals with 
poor self-acceptance who have a history of receiving very little acceptance from others, 
may be more wary at the beginning of therapy. This could be down to the impact of 
„framing‟ on the belief that they will once again be judged and evaluated in this new 
setting; thus their wariness is a means of self-protection. Such individuals tend to use 
more avoidant defences (e.g. repression, withdrawal and denial) in coping with 
psychological conflict and distress (Blatt & Zuroff, 2002) and may subsequently end up 
dropping out of therapy. However, it could be said these are the individuals who would 
benefit most from therapeutic input, as their ability to form healthy relationships in other 
contexts of their life is no doubt also impaired. 
 
Implicit findings in this research may also draw into question the ability of one-off 
„perspective taking‟ techniques to promote change in cognitive therapy (Beck, 1976). 
Self-accepting networks of verbal relations were observed as not strongly related to 




asked “what would you say to a friend who felt this way?” this could activate „other‟ 
relating elements which are somewhat different from the relating elements activated 
when „self‟ framing occurs. This technique would need to be used repeatedly and 
explored fully each time, in order for elements relating to the „other‟ to become 
strengthened in relation to the „self‟.  
 
In terms of the lack of association between explicit and implicit acceptance of others 
scores, the current research also provides important information for clinical psychology 
teaching programmes. Findings indicate there is a need for trainees to learn how to sit 
with their „immediate‟ relational responses to patients and not allow these to drive their 
subsequent behaviour. This demonstrates the value of experiential work during the 
course of training in allowing individuals to develop their empathic „elaborated‟ 
responding; thus improving their rapport with patients. 
 
6.8. Limitations 
This study makes an important contribution to the literature exploring the relationship 
between perfectionism and acceptance for self and towards others, as the constructs up 
until this point have not been explored implicitly. However, when interpreting the 
findings it is important to acknowledge some of the limitations regarding this novel 
approach. In terms of the IRAP task, the numbers of participants unable to maintain at 
least 75% accuracy during test blocks was rather large. Five individuals were unable to 
progress on to the test blocks and of those that did, 37 sets of data had to be discarded 




that were unable to complete the IRAP task and as such it is important to explore 
potential reasons for this.  
 
Barnes-Holmes and colleagues (2006) recommend participants maintain an 80% 
accuracy level throughout test blocks; although researchers have also been known to 
drop this level to 70% (Vahey et al., 2009). In consultation with the author of the 
software (Barnes-Holmes, 2010), it was decided the accuracy level would be held at 
75%, in order to include as many datasets as possible whilst upholding the reliability and 
validity of the task. However, this still resulted in a larger number of participants being 
removed from the sample than most studies report. It therefore appears the IRAP task in 
the present research was rather complex and one reason for this might be the selection of 
words entered into the software. Words such as „pedantic‟ and „meticulous‟ were 
potentially not commonly recognised by participants, or at least were perhaps not 
encountered frequently enough for reinforced learning to take place. This may have 
affected the immediate relational responding required during the task; and in order to 
meet latency constraints, the accuracy of participant responses might have suffered. 
Words typically used in IRAP research include „good‟ and „bad‟, which are more 
common in the English language and as such, may be processed more quickly in terms 
of activating relational responding. Perhaps the complexity of words entered into the 
IRAP software required greater processing in order to activate the relevant relating 
networks, which was not possible in the 2000ms time limit. As such, this may not only 
explain why a large number of participants were unable to maintain response accuracy 




accuracy level was maintained. It could be that extraneous variables such as IQ or 
processing speed allowed participants success with this task and perhaps the IRAP as a 
true measure of relational responding was subsequently affected.  
 
Furthermore, participant debriefing highlighted the fact that „idealistic‟ was frequently 
interpreted as a „positive‟ word and thus incorrectly grouped with the accepting list. This 
confusion adds to the theory that perhaps extra time was required to process the meaning 
of the complex words used in this task. As such, the 2000ms response latency required 
during practice and test blocks should perhaps be adjusted for more complex stimuli 
preparations. In addition, changes could have been made to the initial stage of word 
selection for the IRAP, as some analysis of response latencies at this point may have 
altered the final shortlist of words chosen.  
 
Another factor potentially limiting the findings reported thus far is the use of an 
unspecified „other‟. Karpinski (2004) investigated the role of the other in measuring self-
esteem using the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and found that a specified close „other‟ 
changed not only the degree of positive other-associations, but also affected positive 
self-associations made. So that a close other (e.g. a best friend) was more positive than 
an unspecified other; and furthermore, the use of a close other meant that „self‟ and 
„positive‟ responses were slower. Thus, the object of comparison affected the self-
associations that were made. This research was indentified prior to the current IRAP task 
being set up; however it was decided that in terms of perfectionism, individuals could be 




they have no relation with, given the extent to which they are affected by the actions of 
the „other‟. Although, Suinn (1961) does suggest that the greater the similarity, the more 
accepting an individual is of others. Furthermore, the „other‟ in explicit questionnaires 
was unspecified and in order to match this approach, it was decided to use a „general‟ 
other in the IRAP task. Participants were directed in the initial instructions to think 
generally about others and not about one person in particular, in attempt to overcome the 
influence of an identified „positive‟ or „negative‟ other. However, it is not possible to 
know what impact this had on the final results and further research exploring the 
influence of a „close‟, „unspecified‟, „positive‟ and „negative‟ other would assist in 
identifying this as a potential variable confounding findings on the IRAP. 
 
In terms of the concepts under investigation, their potential impact on IRAP task 
performance may affect the interpretation of the results gained. For example, self-
oriented perfectionists are known to engage in more all-or-nothing thinking and have a 
tendency to over-generalise failure, meaning that minor events are often perceived and 
responded to as though they are major stressors (Hewitt & Flett, 1993). Thus, when a red 
„X‟ appeared onscreen following an incorrect response, participants who were more 
perfectionistic may have been unable to let this go and it could have affected 
performance on the rest of the block; explaining the accuracy levels observed. 
Conversely, it might be that individuals who were low in perfectionism or high in self-
acceptance did not possess the motivation required to complete the complex task 
successfully. Either way, the „75% accuracy‟ dataset may have consisted of a participant 




In addition, being presented with perfectionist-type words might have induced 
performance anxiety regarding the task for both perfectionistic and non-perfectionistic 
individuals. Mednick (1957) demonstrated that anxiety is likely to increase the degree of 
stimulus generalisation, meaning that an individual regards both the „self‟ and „other‟ as 
similar. In RFT terms, this could mean that anxiety causes an individual to become stuck 
in a „self‟ relational frame and it might be difficult to incorporate new elements and form 
new frames, in the presence of anxiety. Thus the „self‟ becomes the centre of all 
relations presented and this could explain the lack of significant results on the IRAP 
when „other‟ relations appeared onscreen. Anxiety could mean that „self‟ was first 
activated during screen presentations and thus response times were insignificant in 
confirming or denying „other‟ relations, as both responses required extra time for „other‟ 
framing to be incorporated. Thus performance anxiety, particularly given the complexity 
of the task, may have affected the results gained. These observations may limit the 
interpretation of findings from an implicit perspective and it could therefore be that 
explicit results more accurately reflect an individual‟s underlying beliefs.   
 
Limitations in the explicit data include the uneven male-female split across course 
studied. It may be that significant differences between male and female acceptance of 
others scores was primarily explained by the course participants studied. The majority of 
female participants were studying clinical psychology, linguistics and psychology 
courses and the majority of males studied science and „other‟ courses. A more equal split 
between males and females across each course would have allowed the true impact of 




study particular courses, or equally that the course an individual studies has an impact on 
their personality; in that perfectionism and acceptance are valued to greater or lesser 
degrees. Therefore separating out the impact of course studied and participant sex would 
allow more clarity regarding differences in acceptance of others scores.  
 
Finally, as this research was exploratory in design a student sample was used to initially 
examine the hypotheses. Findings are therefore limited in terms of their generalisability 
to wider populations. The sample consisted of undergraduate and postgraduate students, 
covering a wide age range; however further research with a clinical population is 
necessary before the implications discussed in Section 6.7 can be supported.  
 
6.9. Conclusions and Future Directions 
This research examined associations between perfectionism and acceptance both for the 
self and towards others; and their link with psychological health. Reported beliefs were 
compared with implicit beliefs and findings were largely consistent with the 
experimental hypotheses presented. Medium to large effects were observed for all 
hypotheses. On explicit measures, higher levels of self-oriented perfectionism were 
significantly associated with lower levels of self-acceptance. The latter construct was 
also found to be the biggest predictor of psychological distress. This provides further 
support for the move towards acceptance-based strategies in the treatment of clinical 
perfectionism, rather than directly targeting excessively high standards. The significant 
difference observed between explicit self-acceptance and acceptance of others was not 




acceptance levels or over-reported their acceptance of others. Possible reasons for this 
were discussed. In addition, all explicit measures demonstrated no significant 
association with implicit findings. Limitations of the IRAP were thus explored; however, 
given that a significant pattern of responding was observed on this task, it is unlikely 
that findings are purely attributable to chance. Participant responses on explicit measures 
are also likely to reflect „perceived‟ self, given the significant patterns observed. As 
such, it appears that individuals‟ responses to these assessment tasks were driven by 
different processes.  
 
Suinn (1961) reported that on measures of „self‟ and „other‟ acceptance; the younger the 
sample, the lower the correlation between the two perspectives. This contrasted with the 
significant correlations observed in all older age groups at the time (e.g. Fey, 1954; 
Williams, 1962). It could therefore be that these contrasting findings are explained by 
individuals‟ developing ability to inhibit immediate relational responding and instead 
form carefully considered responses, based on societal values and increasing levels of 
empathy. Indeed, in relation to the under-reporting of self-acceptance, Bennett and 
Yeeles (1990) provided a tentative indication that the ability to recognise the value of 
modesty emerges at approximately 8 years of age. As such, it is perhaps possible for an 
individual to possess two alternative responses to the same stimulus. Both responses 
could be considered equally „accurate‟ as one might reflect developmental experience 
and the other current adaptive functioning. It therefore appears to be the extent to which 
an individual allows relational responding to influence their behaviour that provides an 




The findings reported here provide a number of directions for future research. Firstly, as 
highlighted, in order to better understand the clinical implications of this research, the 
hypotheses might be explored in further investigations with a clinical participant sample. 
Secondly, the „specific‟ versus „generalised‟ theory of perfectionism (Flett & Hewitt, 
2002) could potentially have affected relational responding on the IRAP task. It may be 
that an individual is perfectionistic in some areas of their life and yet does not have the 
same standards in others. Specifying the context in which an individual‟s perfectionistic 
tendencies are present (e.g. at work or at home) during the IRAP task may therefore 
prove interesting; and might help to clarify further the results observed. Finally, as 
previously outlined, further research exploring the influence of a close, unspecified, 
positive and negative „other‟ would assist in identifying whether the unspecified „other‟ 
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This was thought to be an interesting proposal. The following should be considered and 




 The proposal was well written and presented but a concern was that the language 
would not be accessible to an informed reader and in particular terms such as 
„other acceptance‟ might have been better defined. 
 There is limited information given on all of the measures in relation to reliability 
or validity. Where this is available it should be provided. 





 The consent form needs to be amended to reflect that this is a student, not 
clinical sample. The words “without my care or legal rights being affected” 
might translate as their decision to participate will have no impact on their 
university course? 
 Does the Information sheet imply that this is a study to examine perfectionism 
and psychological disorder? Is there a possibility that students might be 
concerned as to whether this implies, or will assess, levels of psychological 






Research Participant Information Sheet 
 
Study title: Perfectionism and Acceptance: Perspective Taking and Implicit Beliefs 
 
Invitation 
This research study will further investigate the relationship between perfectionism and 
acceptance and you are invited to take part in it if you wish. Before making your decision, it is 
important to understand why the research is being done and what it would involve. Please take 
time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Please 
ask if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information and take your time 
to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this information sheet. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
Research has suggested that the personality construct of perfectionism can leave individuals 
more vulnerable to developing a range of psychological difficulties. Perfectionism is defined as a 
demand for the highest standard of excellence, combined with overly-critical evaluations of 
performance and is thought to consist of both „self‟ and „other‟ components. Only recently has 
acceptance been suggested as a factor that might protect individuals from the negative impact of 
perfectionism. The current study aims to investigate further the relationship between 
perfectionism and acceptance and also examine both „self‟ and „other‟ aspects of these 
constructs. It is hoped the results gained might inform the help offered to perfectionistic 
individuals outside of this study, who are experiencing psychological difficulty. 
 
Finally, implicit (unspoken/unreported) beliefs have been highlighted as important in the 
understanding of psychological difficulty, due to the impact they have on behaviour and 
thinking. These are beliefs that individuals develop based on life experiences and the society in 
which they live. This study aims to look at both reported and unreported aspects of perfectionism 
and acceptance to investigate their interactions with each other. It is hoped that understanding 
the constructs in this extra level of detail might further increase understanding of their roles in 
psychological difficulty; information that again is hoped to benefit those outside of the study. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
We are inviting students from the School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences and 
the School of Health in Social Science at the University of Edinburgh to take part in this study, 
as the first stage of investigating the above relationships. We are hoping to include 85 people in 
this study. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No; you are under no obligation to take part. If you decide not to take part in the study or to 
withdraw, this will have no effect on your studies at the University of Edinburgh. However, if 
you do decide to take part, you are still free to withdraw from the study at any time without 
giving a reason. We would suggest that you take some time to decide whether or not to take part 




What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you do decide to take part, please keep this information sheet and please book a suitable date 
and time to complete the research. You will also be asked for your telephone number and email 
address so the lead researcher can contact you about this appointment if necessary. When you 
attend to complete the research you will be asked to sign a consent form and complete five short 
questionnaires measuring levels of perfectionism and acceptance for self and other. These forms 
should take approximately 30 minutes to complete.  
 
You will then complete a computer-based task that forms the second stage of this research. This 
task involves pressing buttons on a computer to indicate your response to a range of questions 
regarding perfectionism and acceptance and it takes approximately 30 minutes to complete. As 
such, the total time of your participation in this research is likely to be around 60 minutes.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
Apart from the time it takes to fill in the questionnaires and complete the computer task, there 
are no other disadvantages or risks in taking part in this research. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
By taking part in this research you will hopefully contribute towards increasing understanding of 
the relationship between perfectionism and acceptance, and how it is affected by different 
perspectives and unspoken beliefs. This may enable perfectionistic individuals outside of the 
study to overcome a range of psychological difficulties more successfully. 
 
Will my information be kept confidential? 
Yes. Any information that is collected will be stored securely, and will remain confidential. Only 
the lead researcher involved in the running of this study will be allowed access to the 
information. However, if your personal safety or that of others is thought to be „at risk‟ during 
data collection, it may be necessary to disclose this risk to relevant parties to ensure everyone‟s 
safety. Should this happen, you will be kept involved in the information sharing process. Finally, 
if the study is presented or published, all identifying information will be removed so that no 
research participants can be identified.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
Once this study ends in August 2011, it is hoped the findings will be published in an academic 
journal. If you indicate on the consent form that you would like a copy of the main findings from 
the study, they can be sent to you after this date. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This research has been ethically reviewed and approved by the University of Edinburgh Ethics 
Committee and assessed by the South East Scotland Research Ethics Service as not requiring 
further ethical review. 
 
Who can I contact if I need further information? 
If you wish to discuss further any aspect of this research please contact Rachel Lowdon at the 
Clinical Psychology Department, JMHT, Bonnyrigg on 0131 536 8984.  
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. 
 











Study Title: Perfectionism and Acceptance: Perspective Taking and Implicit Beliefs 
 
Lead Researcher: Rachel Lowdon, Specialist Psychological Practitioner,  






- I confirm I have read and understood the attached „Research Participant     Yes       No 
 Information Sheet‟. 
 
- I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I can withdraw     Yes      No 
from this study at any time, without having to give a reason and without  
my studies at the University of Edinburgh being affected. 
 
- I consent to take part in this study.          Yes       No 
 







Signed  Print Name  Date  
 (participant signature)  (participant name)   












Unconditional Self-Acceptance Questionnaire 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please indicate how often you feel each statement below is true or untrue of 
you. For each item, write the appropriate number (1 to 7) on the line to the left of the statement, 



























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
___  1. When someone compliments me for something, I care more about how it makes me feel 
about myself than about what it tells me about my strengths or abilities. 
___  2. I feel worthwhile even if I am not successful in meeting certain goals that are important 
to me. 
___  3. When I receive negative feedback, I take it as an opportunity to improve my behaviour or 
performance. 
___  4. I feel that some people have more value than others. 
___  5. Making a big mistake may be disappointing, but it doesn‟t change how I feel about 
myself overall. 
___  6. Sometimes I find myself thinking about whether I am a good or bad person. 
___  7. To feel like a worthwhile person, I must be loved by the people who are important to me. 
___  8. When I am deciding on goals for myself, trying to gain happiness is more important than 
trying to prove myself. 
___  9. I think that being good at many things makes someone a good person overall. 
___  10. My sense of self-worth depends a lot on how I compare with other people. 
___  11. I believe that I am worthwhile simply because I am a human being. 
___  12. When I receive negative feedback, I often find it hard to be open to what the person is 
saying about me. 
___  13. I set goals for myself that I hope will prove my worth. 
___  14. Being bad at certain things makes me value myself less. 
___  15. I think that people who are successful in what they do are especially worthwhile people. 
___  16. To me, praise is more important for pointing out to me what I'm good at than for 
making me feel valuable as a person. 
___  17. I feel I am a valuable person even when other people disapprove of me. 
___  18. I avoid comparing myself to others to decide if I am a worthwhile person. 
___  19. When I am criticized or when I fail at something, I feel worse about myself as a person. 




Acceptance of Others Scale 
by William F. Fey 
Below you will find 20 statements that deal with some of your feelings and attitudes about other people. 
Read each statement carefully and decide how true you feel the statement to be. Pay attention to your first 



















1. People are too easily led. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. I like people I get to know. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. People these days have pretty low moral standards. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Most people are pretty smug about themselves, 
never really facing their bad points. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I can be comfortable with nearly all kinds of people. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. All people can talk about these days, it seems, is 
movies, TV, and foolishness like that. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. People get ahead because of who they know and not 
because of what they know. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Once you start doing favours for people, they‟ll just 
walk all over you. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. People are too self-centred. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. People are always dissatisfied and hunting for 
something new. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. With many people you don‟t know how you stand. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. You‟ve probably got to hurt someone if you‟re 
going to make something out of yourself. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. People really need a strong, smart leader. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. I enjoy myself most when I am alone, away from 
people. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. I wish people would be more honest with me. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. I enjoy going with a crowd. 1 2 3 4 5 
17. In my experience, people are pretty stubborn and 
unreasonable. 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. I can enjoy being with people whose values are 
very different from mine. 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. Everybody tries to be nice. 1 2 3 4 5 
20. The average person is not very well satisfied with 
himself. 




Online Survey Questions 
 
1. Please rank the words below in order from 1 - 12 according to how closely they resemble 
your understanding of the word 'perfectionist'. I.e. Give the word you believe has the most 
similar meaning to 'perfectionist' a score of 1. Give the word you believe has the least similar 
meaning a score of 12. Each number may only be used once when making your decisions. 
There are no right or wrong answers, so please answer as honestly as you can. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Precisionist             
Fastidious             
Purist             
Evaluative             
Pedantic             
Exacting             
Critical             
Judgemental             
Idealist             
Meticulous             
Demanding             
Nit-Picking             
 
2. Please rank the words below in order from 1 - 12 according to how closely they resemble 
your understanding of the word 'accepting'. I.e. Give the word you believe has the most 
similar meaning to 'accepting' a score of 1. Give the word you believe has the least similar 
meaning a score of 12. Each number may only be used once when making your decisions. 
There are no right or wrong answers, so please answer as honestly as you can. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Kind             
Agreeable             
Compassionate             
Respectful             
Successful             
Lenient             
Tolerant             
Approving             
Positive             
Patient             
Loving             















Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research. Before you begin we would like to 





What is your age? ________________ 
 
 
What is your sex?     male female 
 
 
What university course are you currently enrolled in? ____________________________ 
 
 



















Shown below are examples of the four different types of task you will see repeatedly in 
this part of the experiment. To help you understand the tasks, each of the four examples 
is explained immediately underneath. Please study each example carefully and then read 
the explanation attached to it. Please make sure that you understand the examples before 
continuing with the experiment.  
 
NOTE: During the experiment a range of words with similar meanings to those of 











Select „D‟ for                       Select „K‟ for 




Explanation for Example 1 
 
If you select “Yes” by pressing the „D‟ key, you are stating “Yes, towards myself I am 
perfectionistic.” 
 












Select „D‟ for                       Select „K‟ for 




Explanation for Example 2 
 
If you select “Yes” by pressing the „D‟ key, you are stating “Yes, towards other people I 
am perfectionistic.” 
 
If you select “No” by pressing the „K‟ key, you are stating “No, towards other people I 











Select „D‟ for                       Select „K‟ for 




Explanation for Example 3 
 
If you select “Yes” by pressing the „D‟ key, you are stating “Yes, towards myself I am 
accepting.” 
 












Select „D‟ for                       Select „K‟ for 







Explanation for Example 4 
 
If you select “Yes” by pressing the „D‟ key, you are stating “Yes, towards other people I 
am accepting.” 
 
If you select “No” by pressing the „K‟ key, you are stating “No, towards other people I 







During the experiment you will be asked to respond as quickly and accurately as you 
can across all tasks. 
 
IMPORTANT: It is important to understand that the way you are required to respond to 
the tasks is set by the computer. You will be presented with several tasks in a row that 
together make up one „block‟ of the experiment. During each block you must respond in 
a way that is either generally perfectionistic towards yourself and accepting towards 
others; or generally accepting towards yourself and perfectionistic towards others. 
The correct way of responding will alternate between blocks. At times the correct way of 
responding may agree with what you believe and at other times it may disagree with 
what you believe. This is part of the experiment.  
 
An incorrect response on a task is signalled by the appearance of a red „X‟ in the centre 
of the screen. To remove the red „X‟ and continue, please press the alternative key (to 
make the correct response) as quickly as you can. 
 
NOTE: When the word „others‟ is used in this experiment it signifies other people 
generally. You should therefore think generally about other people and not about one 




A practice phase of the experiment will now begin.  
However, if you do not understand something about these 
instructions or have any further questions, please talk to 







Order 1 -    MPS    USAQ    AOS    GHQ    IRAP1 
Order 2 -    IRAP1    GHQ    MPS    USAQ    AOS 
Order 3 -    USAQ    AOS    MPS    GHQ    IRAP1 
Order 4 -    IRAP1    GHQ    USAQ    AOS    MPS 
Order 5 -    MPS    USAQ    AOS    GHQ    IRAP2 
Order 6 -    IRAP2    GHQ    MPS    USAQ    AOS 
Order 7 -    USAQ    AOS    MPS    GHQ    IRAP2 




MPS – Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale 
USAQ – Unconditional Self Acceptance Questionnaire 
AOS – Acceptance of Others Scale 
GHQ – General Health Questionnaire (12 item version) 
IRAP1 – Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (consistent-first) 





Transformation of the AOS 
(From https://www-304.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg21482329&wv=1)  
 
Here is how to easily find the right linear transformation to convert one Likert scale to another. 
This is best done in two stages. Notice that a Likert scale is determined by its minimum, which 
is usually 1, and its maximum, for example 5. First, find the linear transformation so that in the 
new scale, the minimum is 0 and the maximum is 1. Second, find the transformation which 
undoes this. That is, starting with a scale with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1, transform it 
so it has whatever minimum and maximum is required. 
 
It is easy to check that for a scale with minimum a and maximum b, the transformation              
X = (x - a) / (b - a) is the one we want. Just substitute a for x to see that the result is 0, and then 
substitute b for x to see that the result is 1. To go in the other direction, let's say we want the new 
minimum to be A and the new maximum to be B. The transformation we want is                        
Y = (B - A) * X + A. Substitute 0 for X to see that the result is A, and 1 for X to see that the 
result is B. Now to put this all together, substitute the whole first transformation in place of X in 
the second: Y = (B - A) * (x - a) / (b - a) + A.  
 
That looks just a little messy, but let's apply it to the example of a 5-point scale to be converted 
to a 7-point scale. Since the minimum of the 5-point scale is 1, we have a=1, b=5 in the first 
transformation. Similarly for the second transformation, we have A=1, B=7. Putting them 
together we get: (7 - 1) * (x - 1) / (5 - 1) + 1. Of course this looks a lot less scary if we do the 
subtractions: 6 * (x - 1) / 4 + 1. A little rearrangement gives: (6/4) * x - (6/4) + 1. A little more 
rearrangement and we get: 1.5 * x - 0.5. So in SPSS we just need COMPUTE x2 = 1.5 * x1 - 
0.5. EXECUTE. 
 
You can check the results on a small dataset:  
x1  x2  
1 1.0  
2  2.5  
3  4.0  
4  5.5  
5  7.0 


























FIGURE L: Distribution of Course Studied Across Participant Age 
 
